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The current funding mechanism for theater special 
operations command (SOC) headquarters support costs is 
inadequately supported by legal guidance.  Existing 
legislation and policy documents do not formalize theater 
SOC funding relationships to provide an enforcement tool 
that ensures the theater SOCs can properly resource their 
headquarters support requirements.  Consequently, the 
ambiguity of this funding mechanism has allowed the theater 
SOCs to develop unique scenarios for financing headquarters 
support.  To remedy this deficiency, this thesis conducts a 
comparative analysis of current theater SOC headquarters 
support funding mechanisms and examines three funding 
alternatives.  This thesis concludes the best alternative 
would mandate that the Services assign separate Program 
Element (PE) numbers to theater SOC headquarters support in 
the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) and distribute 
theater SOC headquarters support funding through the 
respective theater combatant commands.  In addition, the 
thesis generates criteria that may be used in preliminary 
analysis by other commands that face similar funding 
ambiguities and may need to identify alternative funding 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
This thesis identifies the best of three alternative 
funding mechanisms for headquarters support costs at 
theater special operations commands (SOCs).  The analysis 
of this topic also generates criteria that may be used to 
establish baseline metrics for other Department of Defense 
(DoD) commands that may require alternate funding 
mechanisms.  The research consists of:  
· A review of the legal guidance and policies for 
theater SOC headquarters support funding 
· A review of the events that caused Under 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C)) to 
issue Program Budget Decision (PBD) 081.  All 
citations of PBD 081 in this chapter refer to PBD 
081 issued in December 2000. 
· A comparative analysis of the funding mechanisms 
for headquarters support costs at the six theater 
SOCs 
· A comparative analysis of three alternative 
funding mechanisms for theater SOC headquarters 
support costs 
· Specific conclusions that identify the best 
alternative funding for theater SOC headquarters 
support 
· General conclusions that may be used in 
preliminary analysis for identifying alternative 
funding mechanisms at other commands where the 
existing legal guidance for funding may not be 
clear 
B. BACKGROUND  
The unique history, mission and funding of the theater 
SOCs created an unanticipated scenario concerning the 
responsibility for funding and managing theater SOC 
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headquarters support costs.  There is a defined source and 
flow of funds for theater SOC special operations (SO)-
peculiar requirements using Major Force Program (MFP)-11 
dollars: the matter is quite different for theater SOC 
headquarters support costs.  U.S. Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM), the theater combatant commands and the 
theater SOCs have adopted separate interpretations 
concerning how the theater SOCs should receive headquarters 
support funding.  
This thesis shows that the current funding mechanism 
for theater SOC headquarters support costs is inadequately 
supported with legal guidance.  To remedy this deficiency, 
this thesis compares three alternative funding mechanisms 
and concludes with the best alternative for theater SOC 
headquarters support funding. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What is the best alternative for funding theater SOC 
headquarters support costs? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
· How do the theater SOCs currently fund 
headquarters support costs? 
· Why did the theater SOCs use MFP-11 dollars to 
fund headquarters support costs in Fiscal Year 
2000 (FY00)? 
· Should the theater SOC funding mechanism for 
headquarters support costs be uniform? 
· What authority is required to make changes in 
funding theater SOC headquarters support costs? 
· What is the financial impact of alternative 
funding mechanisms for theater SOC headquarters 
support costs? 
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D. SCOPE 
Comptroller and budget officials at the commands 
mentioned in this thesis contributed to this research.  
Views from individual personnel may not be representative 
of the command as a whole.  Additionally, the scope of this 
research includes the perspectives of USD(C), Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity 
Conflict) (ASD(SO/LIC)), USSOCOM and the six theater SOCs. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for this research was divided into six 
steps: (1) review of pertinent literature, (2) data 
collection, (3) interviews with comptroller officials and 
budget analysts, (4) analysis of current theater SOC 
headquarters support funding mechanisms, (5) analysis of 
three theater SOC headquarters support funding 
alternatives, and (6) identification of the best 
alternative funding mechanism.  
· Literature Review:  A review of literature and 
legal support references related to theater SOC 
headquarters support funding was conducted.  This 
research included PBDs, USD(C) documents and 
legislation.    
· Data Collection:  Data were collected from the 
six theater SOCs and from USD(C).  These data 
included the total MFP-11 dollars and total MFP-2 
dollars that the theater SOCs spent on 
headquarters support costs in FY00.  These data 
also covered the funding moves directed by PBD 
081. 
· Interviews:  Interview questions were constructed 
from the literature review and the data 
collection.  Comptroller officials from USSOCOM 
and the six theater SOCs were interviewed.  
Additionally, budget officials from USD(C), 
ASD(SO/LIC) and the U.S. Navy Field Support 
Activity were interviewed.     
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· Analysis of theater SOC funding mechanisms:  
Responses to the interviews were synthesized with 
the data collection to conduct a comparative 
analysis of the current theater SOC funding 
mechanisms for headquarters support costs.   
· Analysis of alternative funding mechanisms: 
Information obtained through the interviews.  The 
theater SOC funding mechanism analysis was used 
to conduct a comparative analysis of three 
alternatives for funding theater SOC headquarters 
support costs.   
· Conclusions:  From the funding alternative 
analysis, the best alternative funding mechanism 
for theater SOC headquarters support costs was 
selected.  Additionally, the funding alternative 
analysis generated criteria that may be used to 
establish baseline metrics for other commands 
that may require alternate funding mechanisms.  
F. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II provides a brief background of theater SOC 
command relationships, mission and funding.  From this 
base, the chapter explains how five of the six theater SOCs 
used MFP-11 dollars for funding headquarters support costs 
in FY00.  Next, it analyzes the impact of PBD 081 on 
USSOCOM and on the theater SOCs.  The chapter concludes by 
summarizing the nature of the problem with the current 
funding mechanism for theater SOC headquarters support 
costs.     
Chapter III analyzes theater SOC funding relationships 
for headquarters support costs by examining the theater 
SOCs individually.  Each section of this chapter first 
explains theater SOC relationships with the theater 
combatant command staff and describes the current funding 
mechanism for theater SOC headquarters support costs.  
Next, it looks at theater SOC criteria for separating 
special operations (SO)-peculiar requirements from 
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headquarters support requirements.  The section then 
describes theater SOC funding circumstances in FY00 and the 
local effect of PBD 081 on theater SOC financial 
procedures.  This chapter concludes by summarizing 
variations across theater SOC funding information in a 
comparison table.  
Chapter IV analyzes three alternative funding 
mechanisms in separate sections.  Each section describes 
the alternative and analyzes the effect of the alternative 
funding method on reducing the theater SOC variations 
identified in Chapter III.  This analysis includes the 
requirements for implementing the alternative and any 
remaining barriers to change the alternative would 
encounter.  Each section then looks at the financial impact 
of the alternative on budgets and appropriations linked to 
theater SOC headquarters support.  This chapter concludes 
by summarizing the alternative funding mechanisms in two 
comparison tables. 
Chapter V concludes with the best alternative for 
funding theater SOC headquarters support costs.  Next, this 
chapter draws additional general conclusions from the 
analysis conducted during this research.  Finally, this 
chapter answers the research questions listed in Chapter I 
and suggests areas of further study associated with this 
thesis.     
G. BENEFITS OF STUDY  
The current funding mechanism for theater SOC 
headquarters support costs is inadequately supported with 
legal guidance.  To correct this deficiency, this thesis 
concludes the best alternative funding mechanism for the 
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theater SOCs from three options.  This analysis includes 
the effect of the alternative on reducing variations among 
current theater SOC funding mechanisms, the barriers to 
implementing the alternative and the financial impact of 
the alternative.  Information from this research may help 
smooth the progress of USD(C), USSOCOM and the five theater 
combatant commands to formalizing the funding mechanism for 
theater SOC headquarters support costs.  A formalized 
funding mechanism would provide an enforcement tool to 
ensure that the theater SOCs would be able to properly 
resource their headquarters support requirements. 
Budget issues caused by inadequate legal guidance may 
not be exclusive to the theater SOCs; other commands may 
face similar issues surrounding the interpretation of 
funding mechanisms or financial responsibilities.  This 
thesis also generates criteria that other DoD commands may 
use in preliminary analysis to help identify an alternative 
funding mechanism.  
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II. FUNDING THEATER SOC HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT COSTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The command relationships and financial resources of 
theater special operations commands (SOCs) are unique and 
present very complicated issues.  This chapter will 
establish a common foundation of background information 
concerning theater SOC command relationships, mission and 
funding.  From this base, the chapter will explain how five 
of the six theater SOCs used Major Force Program (MFP)-11 
dollars for funding headquarters support costs in Fiscal 
Year 2000 (FY00).  Next, it will analyze the impact of 
Program Budget Decision (PBD) 081 on U.S. Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) and on the theater SOCs.  All 
citations of PBD 081 in this chapter refer to PBD 081 
issued in December 2000.  Finally, the chapter will 
summarize the nature of the problem with the current 
funding mechanism for theater SOC headquarters support 
costs.     
B. BACKGROUND OF THE THEATER SOCS 
1. History 
Before 1983, the theater SOCs did not exist.  Each 
theater combatant command, then referred to as a geographic 
Commander in Chief (CINC), had its own special operations 
(SO) division traditionally organized in the Operations 
Directorate.  The head of this division was usually an 
Army/Air Force Colonel or a Navy Captain.  The SO division 
was part of the combatant command headquarters staff and 
reported to the combatant commander through the Director of 
Operations.   
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The Cohen-Nunn amendment to the FY87 National Defense 
Authorization Act established the office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity 
Conflict) (ASD(SO/LIC)) and USSOCOM.  This amendment 
changed the face of special operations.  “In Cohen-Nunn, 
Congress recognized that the things that make SOF [special 
operations forces] different from conventional and 
strategic forces dictates a command structure which ensures 
cohesion and optimal use of limited resources.”  [Ref. 1:p. 
51]  USSOCOM emerged as a Service-like organization that 
eventually managed all U.S.-based SOF and, “since 1988, 
each of the theater unified commands have [sic] established 
a separate Special Operations Command (SOC) to meet its 
theater-unique special operations requirements.”  [Ref. 2]  
This means there was a SOC in each of the five geographic 
theaters and an additional SOC established by U.S. Forces 
Korea to handle all SOF on the Korean Peninsula.  
2. Command Relationships 
When the theater combatant commands established the 
theater SOCs, they designated the new organizations as 
subordinate unified (sub-unified) commands.  Uniquely, 
Special Operations Command Korea (SOCKOR) became a 
functional component command of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) 
and not a sub-unified command of U.S. Pacific Command 
(USPACOM).  As Figure 1 shows, each theater combatant 
command had at least four component commands – an Army 
component, a Naval component, an Air Force component and a 
Marine Corps component – and a sub-unified command.  This 
sub-unified command was the theater SOC.  The theater SOC 
commander was now on equal footing with the other Service 
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component commanders and reported directly to the combatant 

















Figure 1. Theater Combatant Command Organization. 
[From: Ref. 1:p. 51] 
 
Initially, the fledgling theater SOCs faced challenges 
in the areas of personnel, staff experience and funding.  
By the mid-1990s, “Congress sought to enhance the cohesion 
of theater SOF by mandating general or flag rank (one-star) 
officers as SOC commanders in Europe and the Pacific, and 
later for the Central and Southern regions.”  [Ref. 1:p. 
52]  Increases in manpower assignments and experience soon 
led to improved staff capabilities.  Finally, in addition 
to the headquarters staff, the theater SOCs also had 
command and control of SOF from the Army, Navy and Air 
Force assigned to support the theater combatant command. 
3. Mission 
The theater SOCs have multiple roles.  “The theater 
SOC commander is responsible to the geographic CINC for 
planning and conducting joint special operations in the 
theater, ensuring that SOF capabilities are matched to 
mission requirements, exercising operational control of SOF 
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for joint special operations, and advising the CINC and 
component commanders in theater on the proper employment of 
SOF.”  [Ref. 3:p. 13]  Additionally, each theater SOC, 
“…has responsibility for SOF-peculiar logistical 
requirements of assigned forces, and forms the core of a 
joint special operational task force able to act 
independently or as the special operations component of a 
larger joint/combined task force.”  [Ref. 1:p. 51]  The 
theater SOC command relationships and many 
responsibilities, however, created unique funding 
requirements.     
4. Funding   
As unified commands, each of the five theater 
combatant commands has a Service component as an executive 
agent to carry out administrative and logistical support of 
headquarters functions.  Service Operations and Maintenance 
(O&M) appropriations fund MFP-2 accounts designated for 
General Purpose Forces.  Thus, the Service executive agents 
send MFP-2 dollars to the combatant commands for direct 
headquarters support requirements.  Table 1 is a list of 
the executive agent assignments for all the unified 
commands. 
Since the theater SOCs are sub-unified commands of the 
respective combatant commands that have SO-peculiar 
requirements and perform SO-activities, funding for the 
theater SOCs became confusing.  USSOCOM funds theater SOC 
SO-peculiar requirements and SO-activities using MFP-11 
dollars.  From Section 167 of Title 10, U.S. Code, the 
functions of MFP-11 include, “…developing and acquiring 
special operations-peculiar equipment and acquiring special 
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operations-peculiar material, supplies and services.”  
[Ref. 5:p. 103]   
 
Combatant Command         Executive Agent 
U.S. European Command      Army 
U.S. Southern Command      Army 
U.S. Joint Forces Command     Navy 
U.S. Pacific Command, except     Navy 
     U.S. Forces Korea      Army 
U.S. Central Command      Air Force 
U.S. Northern Command      Air Force 
U.S. Special Operations Command, except   Air Force 
     Joint Special Operations Command   Army 
U.S. Strategic Command      Air Force 
U.S. Element, North American Air Defense Command Air Force 
 
Table 1. Executive Agent Assignments for Combatant 
Commands. 
[From: Ref. 4:p. 7] 
 
Joint Publication 3-05 defines “special operations-
peculiar” as, 
Equipment, material, supplies, and services 
required for special operations mission support 
for which there is no broad conventional 
requirement.  This includes the standard items 
used by other DOD forces but modified for special 
operations forces (SOF); items initially designed 
for, or used by, SOF until adapted for use as 
Service-common by other DOD forces; and items 
approved by the Commander in Chief, US Special 
Operations Command (USCINCSOC) as critically 
urgent for the immediate accomplishment of a 
special operations mission but not normally 
procured by USCINCSOC,  [Ref. 6:p. GL-10]  
As will be explained later, USSOCOM, the theater 
combatant commands and the theater SOCs interpreted the 
source and flow of funds for theater SOC headquarters 
support in different ways.  
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Before 1987, MFP-11 funding and non-MFP-11 funding for 
special operations was in Service programs.  When USSOCOM 
received MFP-11 funding, however, the U.S. Code did not 
designate any MFP-11 dollars for the theater SOCs.  In PBD 
623 (December 1992), Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller) (USD(C)) provided funding for theater SOC SO-
peculiar requirements for FY93.  [Ref. 7]  This decision 
did not transfer the headquarters support responsibility.  
Through PBD 744 (March 1993), USD(C) provided further MFP-
11 funds for theater SOC SO-peculiar requirements for FY94-
99.  [Ref. 8]  Again, there were no transfers from Service 
funds.  Finally, in February 1996, a USD(C) memorandum 
mandated that, “…all Treasury Index 97 funds received by 
the Department [of Defense] are to be issued and controlled 
using the Program Budget and Accounting System (PBAS).”  
[Ref. 9]  Accordingly, the theater SOCs began to receive 
direct fund distribution of MFP-11 dollars for SO-peculiar 
requirements effective in FY97.  The memorandum did not 
specifically address the funding for theater SOC 
headquarters support costs.  
Before the theater SOCs became sub-unified commands, 
the combatant commands covered all of the headquarters 
costs because the theater SOCs were part of combatant 
command staffs.  Since the theater SOCs remained part of 
combatant command staffs as sub-unified commands, there was 
an assumption that the combatant commands would continue to 
fund these costs.  Unanticipated difficulties arose when 
the theater SOCs became larger through Congressional and 
USSOCOM initiatives during the early 1990s.  The theater 
SOCs had grown and had created larger headquarters support 
bills for the respective combatant commands.  [Ref. 10]  
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Meanwhile, the funding mechanism for theater SOC 
headquarters support costs remained unclear and became 
subject to conflicting interpretations of fiscal 
responsibility.   
C. THEATER SOC HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT FUNDING IN FY00 
Section 167 of Title 10, U.S. Code requires USSOCOM to 
have an inspector general (IG) responsible for conducting, 
“…internal audits and inspections of purchasing and 
contracting actions through the special operations command 
and such other inspector general functions as may be 
assigned.”  [Ref. 5]  In 1999, the USSOCOM IG initiated an 
examination to ensure the theater SOCs were spending their 
MFP-11 dollars correctly.  [Ref. 11]  After obtaining data 
from the theater SOCs, USSOCOM determined how much Service 
MFP-2 funding and how much USSOCOM MFP-11 funding the 
theater SOCs used to pay for FY00 headquarters support 
requirements.  Table 2 presents the percentage allocation 
of how the theater SOCs financed their headquarters support 
in FY00. 
 
Command            Service MFP-2           USSOCOM MFP-11 
SOCCENT        54.6%                    45.4% 
SOCJFCOM                 62.6%                    37.4% 
SOCPAC                   67.1%                    32.9% 
SOCEUR                   79.1%                    20.9% 
SOCKOR                   93.6%                     6.4% 
SOCSOUTH                100.0%                     0.0%  
 
Average                  76.2%                    23.8% 
 
Table 2. FY00 Theater SOC Headquarters Support Funding 
Source Distribution. 
[From: Ref. 12:p. 20] 
 
On average, the theater SOCs used MFP-11 dollars to 
fund 23.8% of their headquarters support costs in FY00.  
  14 
However, the theater SOCs had a wide range: Special 
Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) financed 45.4% of 
headquarters support requirements with MFP-11 dollars while 
Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH) did not use any 
MFP-11 dollars for their headquarters support.   
Additionally, the use of MFP-11 funds on headquarters 
support by the theater SOCs was a continuing occurrence and 
not an isolated event in FY00.  Reasons why the theater 
SOCs used MFP-11 for non-SO-peculiar requirements varied 
across the five theater SOCs.  Chapter III will analyze 
this topic further.   
The USSOCOM interpretation of existing legislation and 
USD(C) documents was that MFP-11 dollars should not finance 
any theater SOC headquarters support costs and that MFP-2 
dollars from the Service O&M appropriations should fund all 
of these expenses.  Thus, USSOCOM believed that all theater 
SOC headquarters support funding profiles should mirror 
SOCSOUTH and that the theater SOCs shown in Table 2 
spending MFP-11 dollars on headquarters support costs in 
FY00 did so incorrectly.  Consequently, USSOCOM took steps 
to ensure the theater SOCs would use future MFP-11 funding 
properly.   
D. PROGRAM BUDGET DECISION 081 (DECEMBER 2000) 
1. Genesis 
USSOCOM sought to prevent the theater SOCs from 
spending MFP-11 dollars on headquarters support.  This 
meant clearly defining the funding mechanism for theater 
SOC headquarters support costs and reaching an agreement on 
this arrangement between USSOCOM and the five theater 
combatant commands.  Given that Department of Defense 
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Directive (DoDD) 5100.3 states, “…the support 
responsibility designated for the headquarters of each 
Combatant Command extends to the headquarters of all 
subordinate joint commands established within the Combatant 
Command,” [Ref. 13:p. 2] USSOCOM believed that the 
appropriate Service executive agent should fund theater SOC 
headquarters costs through the respective theater combatant 
command.      
The USSOCOM IG had conducted its first funding 
investigation at SOCCENT.  From data in PBD 081, SOCCENT 
had spent $353,000 in MFP-11 dollars on headquarters 
support requirements in FY00.  In the case of SOCCENT, the 
Service executive agent (Air Force) had funded $425,000 in 
MFP-2 dollars used by the theater SOC for headquarters 
support.  [Ref 12:p. 20]  Based on DoDD 5100.3, USSOCOM 
inferred that funds for SOCCENT headquarters support should 
flow through U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) as part of 
the headquarters support for that theater combatant 
command.  For this reason, USSOCOM requested USCENTCOM to 
adjust the USCENTCOM headquarters support budget in the out 
years to reflect the additional $353,000 for SOCCENT 
headquarters support and to plan for anticipated SOCCENT 
growth.  USCENTCOM did not meet this request.   
It appeared to USSOCOM and to SOCCENT that USCENTCOM 
interpreted existing legislation and USD(C) documents to 
read that the Service executive agent did not have to 
distribute theater SOC headquarters support costs through 
the theater combatant command.  Further, it seemed as 
though USCENTCOM had already made efforts to separate 
SOCCENT funding from the USCENTCOM budget.  After the 1996 
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USD(C) memorandum [Ref. 9], USCENTCOM attempted through 
official memoranda to switch the funding accounts used by 
SOCCENT from Operating Agency Code (OAC) 51 (Headquarters, 
USCENTCOM) to OAC 52 (USSOCOM).  One USCENTCOM memorandum 
stated, 
USSOCCENT is no longer funded by USCENTCOM, but 
is still included in the USCENTCOM OAC…The OAC is 
used to track funds issued and obligations 
incurred by each command…SOCCENT was formally 
funded by USCENTCOM and was under OAC 51.  
However, when funding channels were reorganized 
in 1993 and SOCCENT began being funded by SOCOM, 
their OAC was not changed.  This is incorrect and 
could cause problems.  [Ref. 14] 
Additional memoranda stated, “…around FY96, 
USSOCCENT’s funding source changed from USCENTCOM to 
USSOCOM, but USSOCCENT continued to use (erroneously) 
USCENTCOM’s OAC 51” [Ref. 15] and, “…since USSOCOM began 
providing authority directly to SOCCENT, continued use of 
USCENTCOM’s OAC to track SOCCENT funding and obligations 
has been wholly inappropriate.”  [Ref. 16]   
Thus, it became apparent that USCENTCOM had adopted a 
cultural mindset that theater SOC headquarters support 
costs should not flow through the theater combatant 
command.  USSOCOM still maintained that the Air Force 
should distribute SOCCENT headquarters support requirements 
through USCENTCOM.  These dissimilar positions evolved to 
an impasse between USSOCOM and USCENTCOM.  Lacking an 
unambiguous support reference, the issue rose to USD(C) for 
a decision on the funding mechanism for theater SOC 
headquarters support costs. 
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2. Decision 
USD(C) decided to resolve this matter through a PBD.  
The first part of PBD 081 attempted to untangle theater SOC 
relationships to combatant command staffs and clarify 
responsibility for theater SOC headquarters support.  The 
decision stated, 
Theater Special Operations Commands (SOCs),…, are 
assigned to Theater CINCs and serve as part of 
the CINC staff.  Because the SOCs are considered 
an integral part of the CINC staff, as a matter 
of practice, the SOC’s direct headquarters 
funding support has generally been provided by 
the appropriate supporting Service.  Generally, 
the funds are provided from the CINC budget but 
in some cases, the funds are provided directly to 
the SOC by Service organizations.  However, in 
either case the source of the funds is the 
Service budgets and is provided as part of the 
Service responsibility to support the CINC 
headquarters operations.  [Ref. 12:pp. 19-20] 
Although PBD 081 explained that the supporting Service 
executive agent was responsible for theater SOC 
headquarters support requirements, the decision did not 
mandate that the funding must flow through the respective 
theater combatant command.   
PBD 081 also acknowledged that the existing 
legislation and policies did not present an official and 
precise route for funding theater SOC headquarters support 
costs.  The decision continued, 
As noted, however, this funding arrangement is 
more a matter of precedence and agreement than 
documented policy.  While DoDD 5100.3, Support of 
the Headquarters of Combatant and Subordinate 
Joint Commands, dated November 15, 1999, is 
explicit in assigning to the Services the 
responsibility to provide administrative and 
logistics support to joint headquarters, the 
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direct headquarters support to SOCs is not 
specifically addressed.  As a result, confusion 
has arisen in support for certain SOCs… [Ref. 
12:p. 20] 
However, PBD 081 did not formalize an unequivocal 
funding mechanism.  Rather, it instructed, 
To ensure that funding responsibilities are 
clearly defined, the alternative directs that 
OUSD(Policy) prepare an amendment to DoDD 5100.3, 
which explicitly states that the source of 
funding for direct headquarters support for the 
Theater SOC is from the appropriate supporting 
Service.  The amended DoDD should further specify 
that the provision of such funding is the 
responsibility of the Theater CINC to which the 
SOC is assigned.  [Ref. 12:p. 20]   
PBD 081 presented a specific funding route for theater 
SOC headquarters support starting with the Service 
executive agent, through the theater combatant command and 
directly to the theater SOC.  Importantly, the decision did 
not implement this route by amending DoDD 5101.3.  It 
merely provided guidance for the amendment.   
The next part of PBD 081 addressed what USD(C) 
interpreted as an incorrect funding distribution between 
the Services and USSOCOM.  USD(C) decided that the data 
from Table 2 gave evidence of over funding the USSOCOM O&M, 
Defense-wide (DW) appropriation (which provides MFP-11 
dollars for SO-peculiar requirements) and of under funding 
the Service O&M appropriations (which provide MFP-2 
dollars).  USD(C) determined that if the theater SOCs used 
MFP-11 dollars for headquarters support requirements in 
FY00, then the funding was in the wrong appropriation.  In 
an attempt to rectify this issue, PBD 081 stated,  
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To be consistent with the policy described 
earlier and to appropriately fund the SOCs, both 
alternatives reduce the USSOCOM budget by $2.5 
million beginning in FY 2002 and increase the 
appropriate Service budgets by the same amount.  
Additionally, another $.4 million is added to the 
Air Force in FY 2002 to increase support to 
SOCCENT.  [Ref. 12:p. 21] 
PBD 081 moved the amounts that the theater SOCs had 
spent from their MFP-11 accounts on headquarters costs in 
FY00 from USSOCOM to the Services.  The move started in 
FY02 and continued through FY07.  Table 3 shows these 
funding adjustments in millions of dollars.         
 
                              (Dollars in Millions) 
Appropriation       FY02   FY03   FY04   FY05   FY06   FY07 
 
O&M – Army          +0.6   +0.6   +0.6   +0.7   +0.7   +0.7  
    - SOCKOR        +0.1   +0.1   +0.1   +0.1   +0.1   +0.1 
    - SOCEUR        +0.5   +0.5   +0.5   +0.6   +0.6   +0.6 
 
O&M – Navy          +1.5   +1.5   +1.5   +1.5   +1.5   +1.6 
    - SOCPAC        +0.8   +0.8   +0.8   +0.8   +0.8   +0.8 
    - SOCJFCOM      +0.7   +0.7   +0.7   +0.7   +0.7   +0.8 
 
O&M – Air Force     +0.8   +0.8   +0.8   +0.8   +0.8   +0.8 
    - SOCCENT       +0.8   +0.8   +0.8   +0.8   +0.8   +0.8 
 
O&M, DW – USSOCOM   -2.5   -2.5   -2.5   -2.6   -2.6   -2.7 
 
Table 3. PBD 081 Funding Adjustments.  
[From: Ref. 12:p. 21] 
 
3. Impact 
After USD(C) issued PBD 081, USSOCOM directed its own 
adjustment of MFP-11 funds.  For FY02-07, USSOCOM reduced 
each theater SOC MFP-11 account by the appropriate amount 
of the funds moved from USSOCOM to the Service in PBD 081.  
[Ref. 17]  For example, Table 3 shows that the decision 
moved $0.8 M from USSOCOM to the Department of Navy in FY02 
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for Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) 
headquarters support costs.  Consequently, USSOCOM deducted 
this exact amount from the SOCPAC FY02 MFP-11 budget.  
Chapter III contains a further analysis of the effect of 
these funding reductions on each theater SOC.      
Additionally, USSOCOM prohibited the theater SOCs from 
using MFP-11 funds for headquarters support costs as had 
occurred in FY00.  A memorandum from USCINCSOC in February 
2001 instructed each theater SOC, “…to work with their 
respective CINC resourcing process to obtain the support 
needed to operate the SOC headquarters.  The MFP-11 dollars 
USSOCOM provides you [the theater SOCs] will be dedicated 
to SO-peculiar requirements and SOF mission activities 
only.”  [Ref. 18]  The theater SOCs had to identify 
expenditures as SO-peculiar or as headquarters support and 
procure MFP-2 dollars for all non-SO-peculiar requirements.  
However, the funding mechanism for theater SOC headquarters 
support was still not defined.  USD(C) had not amended DoDD 
5100.3 in accordance with PBD 081 and the directive remains 
unamended.     
E. SUMMARY  
The unique history, mission and funding of theater 
special operations commands created an unanticipated 
scenario concerning the responsibility for funding and 
managing theater SOC headquarters support costs.  While 
there is a defined source and flow of funds for theater SOC 
SO-peculiar requirements using MFP-11 dollars, the matter 
is quite different for theater SOC headquarters support 
costs.  USSOCOM, the theater combatant commands and the 
theater SOCs have adopted separate interpretations 
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concerning how the theater SOCs should receive headquarters 
support funding. 
The current funding mechanism for theater SOC 
headquarters support costs is inadequately supported with 
legal guidance.  Existing legislation and policy documents, 
including PBD 081, do not formalize theater SOC funding 
relationships to provide an enforcement tool that ensures 
the theater SOCs can properly resource their headquarters 
support requirements.  In the following chapters, a remedy 
will be presented for this deficiency.     
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III. THEATER SOC FUNDING MECHANISMS FOR HEADQUARTERS 
SUPPORT COSTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Spread around the world, the six theater special 
operations commands (SOCs) have separate methods for 
financing headquarters support requirements.  This chapter 
will analyze theater SOC funding relationships for 
headquarters support costs by examining the theater SOCs 
individually from the perspective of theater SOC 
comptroller officials.  Each section of this chapter will 
first show theater SOC command relationships through an 
organizational chart, explain theater SOC comptroller 
relationships with the theater combatant command staff and 
describe the current funding mechanism for theater SOC 
headquarters support costs.  Next, it will look at theater 
SOC criteria for separating special operations (SO)-
peculiar requirements from headquarters support 
requirements.  The section will then explain theater SOC 
funding circumstances in Fiscal Year 2000 (FY00) and the 
local effect of Program Budget Decision (PBD) 081 on 
theater SOC financial procedures.  All citations of PBD 081 
in this chapter refer to PBD 081 issued in December 2000.  
Finally, this chapter will summarize the theater SOC 
funding information in a comparison table.  
B. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND CENTRAL (SOCCENT) 
1. Theater Combatant Command Relationships  
SOCCENT is a subordinate unified (sub-unified) command 
of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM).  Figure 2 shows 
USCENTCOM organization.  The Service executive agent for 
USCENTCOM headquarters support requirements is the 
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Department of the Air Force.  Since Department of Defense 
Directive (DoDD) 5100.3 assigned headquarters support 
responsibility for combatant command subordinate joint 
commands to the same Service executive agent as the 
respective combatant command [Ref. 13:p. 2], the Air Force 




















Figure 2. U.S. Central Command Organization. 
[From: Ref. 19] 
 
SOCCENT believes that USCENTCOM views the theater SOC 
as the USCENTCOM SO component command.  Similar to other 
USCENTCOM component commands, such as U.S. Naval Forces 
Central Command, USCENTCOM does not want any role in 
funding SOCCENT headquarters costs.  [Ref. 20]  SOCCENT 
does not submit Program Objective Memorandum (POM) input to 
USCENTCOM and USCENTCOM does not distribute any 
headquarters support dollars to SOCCENT.  Thus, there is no 
formal funding relationship between USCENTCOM and SOCCENT.  
In addressing the funding flow of SOCCENT non-SO-Peculiar 
costs, a USCENTCOM comptroller official told SOCCENT, “…our 
[USCENTCOM] only stipulation was that the theater CINC 
didn’t want the money for his ‘SOF Component’ commingled 
with that of his HQ [headquarters].”  [Ref. 21]  Thus, 
there is no formal arrangement between the two comptroller 
divisions concerning SOCCENT headquarters support.   
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2. Headquarters Support Funding Mechanism 
SOCCENT headquarters support funds flow from the Air 
Force Operations & Maintenance (O&M) appropriation account, 
and through Headquarters, Eleventh Wing.  Eleventh Wing 
also distributes headquarters support to numerous Air Force 
commands and activities in the National Capital Region 
including the Pentagon, the Air Force Honor Guard and the 
Air Force Band.  [Ref. 22]  SOCCENT receives the Major 
Force Program (MFP)-2 dollars in an Operating Budget 
Activity Document (OBAD) via fax from Eleventh Wing.  
SOCCENT then uses the OBAD as authorization to load funds 
into the SOCCENT accounting system.  Eleventh Wing sends an 
OBAD to SOCCENT on a quarterly basis, which allows the 
SOCCENT comptroller to manage the MFP-2 funding for SOCCENT 
headquarters support requirements.  [Ref. 20]   
The path for SOCCENT to submit POM input for future 
headquarters support requirements is not clear.  Before PBD 
081, SOCCENT did not make a separate POM submission for 
headquarters support.  The first opportunity for SOCCENT to 
submit input will be for the FY04 POM.  To date, SOCCENT, 
Eleventh Wing and the Air Force are working to define this 
request route.  USCENTCOM is not involved in the fund 
distribution or the POM submission process for SOCCENT 
headquarters support requirements.   
3. SO-Peculiar vs. Headquarters Support 
Before Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 
(USD(C)) released PBD 081, SOCCENT did not distinguish 
between SO-peculiar and headquarters support requirements.  
SOCCENT considered all costs as SO-peculiar and used MFP-11 
funds for these expenses.  [Ref. 20]  Additionally, SOCCENT 
included headquarters support costs in POM submissions to 
  26 
U.S. Special Operations Command (USSSOCOM) for SOCCENT MFP-
11 funds.  
In April 2000, USSOCOM comptrollers distributed the 
Theater SOC Support Matrix to theater SOC comptrollers.  
This matrix divided theater SOC costs into four categories 
– Common Support, Base Operations [Operating] Support, 
Direct Headquarters Support and Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) Operational Requirements – and designated the 
financial responsibility for each cost.  The Theater SOC 
Support Matrix is included as Appendix A. 
SOCCENT began using this matrix for FY02 requirements 
to determine which costs were for SO-peculiar activities 
and which costs were for headquarters support.  
Subsequently, SOCCENT used MFP-11 dollars to finance SO-
peculiar costs and MFP-2 dollars to finance headquarters 
support costs.        
4. FY00 Funding Issues 
From the data in PBD 081, SOCCENT used $353,000 from 
MFP-11 funds on headquarters support requirements.  The 
Service executive agent (Air Force) financed $425,000 of 
SOCCENT headquarters support requirements with MFP-2 funds.  
Table 4 shows this funding summary for all the theater 
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             (Dollars in Thousands) 
Command         Services        USSOCOM          Total 
SOCCENT              425           353            778 
SOCJFCOM            1,190           710           1,900    
SOCPAC    1,450           710          2,160 
SOCEUR            1,956           517          2,473 
SOCKOR    1,438            99           1,537 
SOCSOUTH        3,851             0          3,851 
Total           10,310         2,389          12,699 
 
Table 4. FY00 Theater SOC Direct Headquarters Support. 
[From: Ref. 12:p. 20] 
 
5. Consequences of PBD 081 
PBD 081 increased the MFP-2 funding available for 
SOCCENT headquarters support by moving $800,000 from 
USSOCOM to the Air Force.  Table 3 in Chapter II shows this 
funding transfer.  Consequently, USSOCOM reduced SOCCENT 
MFP-11 funding by this same figure.  Since SOCCENT 
previously had used MFP-11 dollars on headquarters support, 
the move and the reduction effectively cancelled each other 
out.  However, the Air Force did impose a 16% “tax” on the 
funds moved from USSOCOM.  Thus, SOCCENT only received 
$672,000 for its headquarters support requirements in FY02.  
This meant that SOCCENT received just 84% of the funds that 
USSOCOM deducted from SOCCENT MFP-11 dollars back from the 
Air Force as headquarters support.  This 16% “tax” is a way 
for the Air Force to pass on across the board reductions in 
the Air Force O&M appropriation to the commands that 
receive MFP-2 dollars from the Air Force.  This “tax” was 
never returned.  [Ref. 20]          
Ensuring that SOCCENT received the funding was more 
complicated.  PBD 081 did not provide a tracking instrument 
for the funding move from USSOCOM to the Services to make 
certain that the theater SOCs received the funds for their 
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headquarters support requirements.  Further, SOCCENT had 
not received MFP-2 funding before.  The SOCCENT comptroller 
had to contact Air Force staff to coordinate a distribution 
method for SOCCENT headquarters support funds.  After 
examining many alternatives, including flowing the funds 
through USCENTCOM, Air Force staff decided to send SOCCENT 
headquarters support funding through Headquarters, Eleventh 
Wing.  [Ref. 20] 
PBD 081 significantly reduced the flexibility of the 
SOCCENT comptroller.  Before the decision, SOCCENT SO-
peculiar and headquarters support requirements came from 
the same MFP-11 account.  Currently, SOCCENT must separate 
these costs and use MFP-11 funds strictly for SO-peculiar 
requirements.  However, because PBD 081 did not amend DoDD 
5100.3, SOCCENT still does not have a defined POM 
submission process.  This lack of clarity means more work 
for SOCCENT comptrollers in meeting new administrative 
requirements and deciding where to surface budget issues.  
C. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND EUROPE (SOCEUR) 
1. Theater Combatant Command Relationships 
SOCEUR is a sub-unified command of U.S. European 



















Figure 3. U.S. European Command Organization. 
[From: Ref. 23] 
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The Service executive agent for USEUCOM headquarters 
requirements is the Department of the Army.  Since DoDD 
5100.3 assigned headquarters support responsibility for 
combatant command subordinate joint commands to the same 
Service executive agent as the respective combatant command 
[Ref. 13:p. 2], the Army O&M appropriation also funds 
SOCEUR headquarters support costs.  However, the MFP-2 
funding for SOCEUR headquarters support requirements is 
buried in the headquarters support budget for USEUCOM.  
SOCEUR headquarters support does not have a separate 
funding line: there is no identifiable ceiling or floor for 
the amount of USEUCOM headquarters support funds that will 
fund SOCEUR headquarters support requirements.  [Ref. 24] 
SOCEUR believes that USEUCOM views the theater SOC as 
a “Special Staff” of USEUCOM.  Using this informal 
designation, USEUCOM controls the funding of SOCEUR 
headquarters support through a cost transfer process that 
will be described in the next sub-section.  USEUCOM made 
the decision to use the cost transfer method [Ref. 24], but 
the system could change if a new USEUCOM comptroller wanted 
to use a different financial process.  
Additionally, a USEUCOM staff member told the SOCEUR 
comptroller, “…SOCEUR is not part of EUCOM and EUCOM has no 
responsibility for any funding of SOCEUR.”  [Ref. 24]  This 
endeavor to financially separate SOCEUR from USEUCOM 
presented significant barriers to establishing a cohesive 
working relationship between the USEUCOM comptroller staff 
and the SOCEUR comptroller staff.     
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2. Headquarters Support Funding Mechanism 
SOCEUR funds headquarters support costs using a cost 
transfer process with USEUCOM.  Initially, the SOCEUR 
comptroller must expend MFP-11 funds up front for any 
headquarters support requirements and then submit a cost 
transfer request to USEUCOM.  After the disbursement has 
been processed by the Defense Finance and Accounting 
Service (DFAS), USEUCOM may accept a cost transfer for the 
expense.  This action moves the obligation and the 
disbursement from the SOCEUR MFP-11 account to the USEUCOM 
MFP-2 account at DFAS.  However, this cost transfer is 
conditional upon USEUCOM validating the request.  During 
this process, USEUCOM could decide that the expense was not 
a SOCEUR headquarters support requirement and refuse to 
assume the cost transfer obligation.  In that case, SOCEUR 
would have to absorb the expense with MFP-11 dollars.  
[Ref. 25]    
This system prevents SOCEUR from using the MFP-11 
funds temporarily spent on a headquarters support cost 
while waiting for USEUCOM to assume the cost transfer 
obligation.  Additionally, there have been historical 
delays at DFAS in processing the cost transfers to USEUCOM 
and in posting the disbursements.  Headquarters support 
costs that occur late in the fiscal year often post in the 
subsequent fiscal year.  Thus, because the cost transfers 
are based on actual disbursements, there is nothing left to 
cost transfer to USEUCOM after the fiscal year ends.  
SOCEUR often has absorbed these late requirements with MFP-
11 dollars.  [Ref. 24]      
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SOCEUR has no path to submit POM input for future 
headquarters support requirements.  U.S. Army Europe staff 
told the SOCEUR comptroller that SOCEUR input for 
headquarter support was not relevant because, “…all funds 
were pulled from the Services and given to SOCOM years 
ago.”  [Ref. 25]  Moreover, after USEUCOM receives its MFP-
2 dollars from the Army, the SOCEUR comptroller does not 
know the amount of headquarters support funding available 
for the subsequent fiscal year.  As USEUCOM assumes cost 
transfers for SOCEUR headquarters support, the SOCEUR 
comptroller has no visibility on how much more SOCEUR 
headquarters support costs will be assumed by USEUCOM 
during the rest of the fiscal year.  [Ref. 24]  This void 
of financial information and awareness makes it extremely 
difficult for SOCEUR to budget and manage headquarters 
support requirements.      
3. SO-Peculiar vs. Headquarters Support 
To determine whether a cost is SO-peculiar, SOCEUR 
evaluates the deployment relevance of the requirement.  All 
costs associated with deployment away from SOCEUR garrison 
headquarters are SO-peculiar.  This includes a deployable 
local area network (LAN) for SOCEUR information technology 
and any logistical support required during deployments by 
SOCEUR headquarters personnel.  SOCEUR uses MFP-11 dollars 
to finance these deployment costs.  Requirements for the 
SOCEUR garrison facility are headquarters support costs.  
Examples include furniture, office supplies and the secure 
LAN (SLAN) used by SOCEUR headquarters personnel in 
garrison.  SOCEUR submits cost transfer requests to USEUCOM 
for these costs.  [Ref. 25]   
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4. FY00 Funding Issues 
From the data in PBD 081, SOCEUR spent $517,000 of 
MFP-11 funds on headquarters support requirements in FY00.  
This included $305,000 on SLAN equipment (servers, 
terminals and fiber-optic wires) and $68,000 for minor 
repairs and maintenance of the building maintained by 
Untied States Army Europe.  [Ref. 25]  SOCEUR submitted 
cost transfer requests to USEUCOM for these requirements, 
but USEUCOM refused to assume these obligations.  USEUCOM 
assumed the obligation for $1,956,000 in other FY00 SOCEUR 
headquarters support costs.  These requirements were funded 
by the Army O&M appropriation through USEUCOM.  Table 5 
shows this funding summary.     
 
             (Dollars in Thousands) 
Command             Army        USSOCOM          Total 
SOCEUR            1,956           517          2,473 
 
Table 5. FY00 SOCEUR Direct Headquarters Support.  
[From: Ref. 12:p. 20] 
 
5. Consequences of PBD 081 
PBD 081 increased the MFP-2 funding available for 
SOCEUR headquarters support by moving $500,000 from USSOCOM 
to the Army.  Table 3 in Chapter II shows this funding 
transfer.  Consequently, USSOCOM reduced SOCEUR MFP-11 
funds by this same amount.  However, almost all of the MFP-
11 dollars SOCEUR spent on headquarters support, such as 
the SLAN infrastructure costs, were one-time expenses that 
SOCEUR would not incur in the out years.  [Ref. 25]  Thus, 
PBD 081 increased USEUCOM fiscal flexibility for managing 
headquarters support and reduced SOCEUR fiscal resources by 
cutting the SOCEUR MFP-11 budget by 20% for FY02-07. 
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The Army distributed the funding move for SOCEUR 
headquarters support in PBD 081 through USEUCOM.  Since PBD 
081 did not provide a tracking mechanism for the funding 
move, the SOCEUR comptroller notified USEUCOM of the 
importance that SOCEUR receive the entire funding move for 
FY02-07 headquarters support.  USEUCOM refused to transfer 
any MFP-2 funds to SOCEUR and intended to continue the cost 
transfer process.  However, USEUCOM assured SOCEUR that the 
full move would be allocated for SOCEUR headquarters 
support requirements and that “…they [USEUCOM] are running 
a ‘checkbook’ to see what they spend in our [SOCEUR] 
support.”  [Ref. 25]  This means that USEUCOM would not 
“tax” the funding move and that SOCEUR would receive 100% 
of the MFP-2 dollars moved from USSOCOM. 
By identifying the amount of the funding move for 
SOCEUR headquarters costs, PBD 081 provided the SOCEUR 
comptroller with a baseline minimum for SOCEUR headquarters 
support requirements.  Although USEUCOM might accept future 
cost transfer obligations that exceed the amounts moved for 
SOCEUR headquarters support in PBD 081, SOCEUR now has 
visibility on a quantifiable amount of MFP-2 funds 
available for SOCEUR headquarters costs.        
D. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND JOINT FORCES COMMAND 
(SOCJFCOM) 
1. Theater Combatant Command Relationships 
SOCJFCOM is a sub-unified command of U.S. Joint Forces 
Command (USJFCOM).  Figure 4 shows USJFCOM organization. 
 











































U.S. Joint Forces Command
(USJFCOM)
 
Figure 4. U.S. Joint Forces Command Organization.  
[From: Ref. 26] 
 
The Service executive agent for USJFCOM headquarters 
requirements is the Department of the Navy.  Since DoDD 
5100.3 assigned headquarters support responsibility for 
combatant command subordinate joint commands to the same 
Service executive agent as the respective combatant command 
[Ref. 13:p. 2], the Navy O&M appropriation also funds 
SOCJFCOM headquarters support costs.   
MFP-2 funding for SOCJFCOM headquarters support 
requirements is buried in the headquarters support budget 
for USJFCOM without a separate funding line.  Although 
legally responsible for SOCJFCOM MFP-11 expenses on SO-
peculiar requirements, the SOCJFCOM comptroller is not 
responsible for SOCJFCOM MFP-2 expenses on headquarters 
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support requirements.  The USJFCOM comptroller retains this 
legal authority.  For MFP-2 dollars, the SOCJFCOM 
comptroller has the same status as any other member on the 
USJFCOM comptroller staff.  [Ref. 27]   
2. Headquarters Support Funding Mechanism 
USJFCOM comptrollers treat the MFP-2 funding for 
SOCJFCOM headquarters support the same as funding 
headquarters support costs for other divisions of USJFCOM 
staff, such as the Operations Directorate or the 
Intelligence Directorate.  At the beginning of each fiscal 
year, the SOCJFCOM comptroller receives a control number 
from USJFCOM that identifies the SOCJFCOM MFP-2 budget for 
headquarters support requirements over the entire year.  
However, USJFCOM keeps all SOCJFCOM headquarters support 
contained within the USJFCOM MFP-2 budget and uses a 
funding approval process for most expenses.   
To pay for headquarters support requirements less than 
$2,500, the SOCJFCOM comptroller uses the Government 
Purchase Card.  USJFCOM deducts SOCJFCOM expenses charged 
with the Government Purchase Card directly from the 
SOCJFCOM MFP-2 budget.  No approval from the USJFCOM is 
necessary.  However, for expenses greater than $2,500, 
including contracts, SOCJFCOM must submit the documents to 
USJFCOM for approval.  Subsequently, if USJFCOM supports 
the expense, the USJFCOM comptroller signs the contract (or 
funds the expense) and deducts the costs from the SOCJFCOM 
MFP-2 budget.  [Ref. 27]        
During this process, the USJFCOM comptroller could 
disapprove a SOCJFCOM request for MFP-2 funding.  In that 
case, the SOCJFCOM comptroller would have to find another 
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method to fund the requirement or choose not to incur the 
expense.  Additionally, SOCJFCOM submits POM input for 
headquarters support requirements directly to the USJFCOM.  
USJFCOM immediately rolls this submission into the USJFCOM 
headquarters support budget and eliminates any possible 
tracking of the input by SOCJFCOM during the budget 
process.  [Ref. 27]  Thus, SOCJFCOM headquarters support 
becomes part of USJFCOM headquarters support.   
Through experience, SOCJFCOM has learned what 
headquarters support requirements USJFCOM approves for MFP-
2 funding.  However, there has been a high turnover rate of 
personnel on the USJFCOM staff.  This means that the 
informal relationship between the USJFCOM comptroller staff 
and the SOCJFCOM comptroller staff constantly changes.     
3. SO-Peculiar vs. Headquarters Support 
SOCJFCOM “…conducts worldwide joint SOF training and 
facilitates joint integration to enhance the effectiveness 
and interoperability of special operations forces in joint, 
multinational, and interagency environments.”  [Ref. 3]  
This mission is unique among the six theater SOCs and 
provides SOCJFCOM with criteria for separating SO-peculiar 
costs from headquarters support costs.  If a requirement 
supports a SOF training deployment, it is SO-peculiar.  
Costs related to administrative requirements in garrison, 
however, are headquarters support.  These expenses do not 
directly support the SOCJFCOM joint training team.  
Examples include copiers, computer support and garrison 
contracts. [Ref. 27]       
Before USD(C) released PBD 081, SOCJFCOM did not use 
MFP-11 funds exclusively for SO-peculiar requirements.  
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SOCJFCOM funded most headquarters support costs with MFP-2 
dollars from USJFCOM.  However, the lack of specific 
guidance on funding headquarters support allowed the 
SOCJFCOM comptroller to supplement headquarters support 
requirements not approved by USJFCOM with MFP-11 dollars.  
[Ref. 27]  After PBD 081, USSOCOM prohibited the theater 
SOCs from using MFP-11 dollars on non-SO-peculiar 
requirements.  [Ref. 18]   
4. FY00 Funding Issues 
From the data in PBD 081, SOCJFCOM spent $710,000 of 
MFP-11 funds on headquarters support requirements in FY00.  
These were headquarters support costs that USJFCOM had 
disapproved for MFP-2 funding and that SOCJFCOM had funded 
with MFP-11 dollars.  USJFCOM approved $1,190,000 in FY00 
SOCJFCOM headquarters support costs.  These requirements 
were funded from the Navy O&M appropriation through 
USJFCOM.  Table 6 shows this funding summary.     
 
             (Dollars in Thousands) 
Command             Navy         USSOCOM          Total 
SOCJFCOM            1,190            710          1,900    
 
Table 6. FY00 SOCJFCOM Direct Headquarters Support. 
[From: Ref. 12:p. 20] 
 
5. Consequences of PBD 081 
PBD 081 increased the MFP-2 funding available for 
SOCJFCOM headquarters support by moving $700,000 from 
USSOCOM to the Navy.  Table 3 in Chapter II shows this 
funding transfer.  Consequently, USSOCOM reduced SOCJFCOM 
MFP-11 funds by this same amount.  The Navy distributed the 
funding move for SOCJFCOM headquarters support in PBD 081 
through USJFCOM.  Although PBD 081 did not provide a 
tracking mechanism for the move, the SOCJFCOM comptroller 
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has already seen a specific line item in the USJFCOM FY02 
budget for the funding move from USSOCOM and is confident 
that SOCJFCOM will receive this headquarters support for 
FY03-07.  However, USJFCOM traditionally imposes a 5% 
“withhold” on all MFP-2 funds distributed to USJFCOM 
commands.  [Ref. 27]  Thus, at the beginning of the fiscal 
year, SOCJFCOM will only receive 95% of the amount that 
USSOCOM deducted from SOCJFCOM MFP-11 funds back as MFP-2 
funding for SOCJFCOM headquarters support.   
USJFCOM shields this “withhold” until the end of each 
fiscal year.  At that time, all USJFCOM commands compete 
for the “withhold” to finance any unfunded requirements 
(UFRs).  [Ref. 27]  This means that SOCJFCOM could either 
receive more MFP-2 dollars for headquarters support UFRs 
than the 5% that USJFCOM deducted or not get any of the 
MFP-2 deduction back at all.           
Additionally, when the SOCJFCOM comptroller submits 
future headquarters support POM inputs to USJFCOM, the 
amount may not be rolled into the USJFCOM headquarters 
support budget.  Thus, future SOCJFCOM headquarters support 
requirements may have to compete with other USJFCOM 
priorities, including USJFCOM headquarters support 
requirements.    
E. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND KOREA (SOCKOR) 
1. Theater Combatant Command Relationships 
The specific SO requirements on the Korean Peninsula 
precipitated the requirement for U.S. Pacific Command 
(USPACOM) to have two theater SOCs: Special Operations 
Command Pacific (SOCPAC) and SOCKOR.  However,  
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…because of the unique command relationships in 
Korea, SOCKOR is the only theater SOC that is not 
a subordinate unified command.  Established in 
1988 as a functional component command of U.S. 
Forces, Korea (USFK), SOCKOR is the principal 
organization responsible for the integration of 
U.S. SOF in Korea.  [Ref. 3] 








































Figure 5. U.S. Pacific Command Organization.   
[From: Ref. 28] 
 
Although USFK is a sub-unified command of USPACOM, the 
Service executive agent for USFK headquarters requirements 
is the Department of the Army.  Thus, the Army O&M 
appropriation funds SOCKOR headquarters support costs.  
Funds flow from the Army through Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) in 
Korea to SOCKOR via a Funding Authorization Document (FAD).  
EUSA handles MFP-2 funding for all USFK commands and SOCKOR 
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headquarters support does not have a separate funding line 
within the EUSA MFP-2 account.  [Ref. 29]      
2. Headquarters Support Funding Mechanism 
EUSA funds SOCKOR headquarters support costs using a 
funding approval process.  The SOCKOR comptroller must 
submit a formal request to EUSA for each headquarters 
support requirement and then wait for a FAD that permits 
SOCKOR to use MFP-2 dollars for that particular expense.  
During this process, EUSA could disapprove a SOCKOR request 
for MFP-2 funding.  In that case, the SOCKOR comptroller 
would have to find an alternate funding source for the 
requirement.  [Ref. 29] 
Additionally, The SOCKOR comptroller provides input to 
the EUSA POM for future SOCKOR headquarters support 
requirements.  EUSA, however, combines headquarters support 
inputs from all USFK component commands to make one POM 
submission to the Army for MFP-2 dollars.  Although EUSA 
receives funding from the Army at the beginning of the 
fiscal year, the SOCKOR comptroller does not know the 
amount of MFP-2 funding available for SOCKOR headquarters 
support.      
3. SO-Peculiar vs. Headquarters Support 
SOCKOR uses the Theater SOC Support Matrix distributed 
to theater SOC comptrollers by USSOCOM in April 2000 to 
separate SO-peculiar requirements from headquarters support 
requirements.  This matrix divided costs into four 
categories – Common Support, Base Operations [Operating] 
Support, Direct Headquarters Support and Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) Operational Requirements – and designated the 
financial responsibility for each cost.  The Theater SOC 
Support Matrix is included as Appendix A.  Accordingly, 
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SOCKOR uses MFP-11 dollars to finance SO-peculiar costs and 
requests MFP-2 dollars from EUSA to finance headquarters 
support costs.  [Ref. 29]        
4. FY00 Funding Issues 
From the data in PBD 081, SOCKOR spent $99,000 of MFP-
11 funds on headquarters support requirements in FY00.  
EUSA approved funding for $1,438,000 in FY00 SOCKOR 
headquarters support costs.  These requirements were funded 
by the Army O&M appropriation through EUSA.  Table 7 shows 
this funding summary.     
 
                     (Dollars in Thousands) 
Command             Army        USSOCOM          Total 
SOCKOR    1,438            99           1,537 
 
Table 7. FY00 SOCKOR Direct Headquarters Support.  
[From: Ref. 12:p. 20] 
 
5. Consequences of PBD 081 
PBD 081 increased the MFP-2 funding available for 
SOCKOR headquarters support by moving $100,000 from USSOCOM 
to the Army.  Table 3 in Chapter II shows this funding 
transfer.  Consequently, USSOCOM reduced SOCKOR MFP-11 
funds by this same amount.   
Although PBD 081 did not provide a tracking mechanism 
for the move, the SOCKOR comptroller received a funding 
letter from EUSA Headquarters Activity that allocated the 
funds from USSOCOM to SOCKOR headquarters support for FY02-
07.  However, SOCKOR received its FY02 MFP-2 funding 
through two different funding paths.  SOCKOR received 
$180,000 from the Army through EUSA.  This distribution was 
consistent with historical amounts SOCKOR has received for 
headquarters support.  In addition, the Army distributed 
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the $100,000 funding move from USSOCOM through an Army 
Management Headquarters Activities account owned by 
USPACOM.  Although EUSA comptrollers traditionally “tax” 5% 
of all MFP-2 funds, the EUSA funding letter showed that 
SOCKOR would receive the entire FY02 funding move from 
USSOCOM for headquarters support without reduction.  The 
SOCKOR comptroller is not sure if this rare tax exemption 
will continue in the out years.  [Ref. 29]         
Significantly, the EUSA funding letter also provided 
the SOCKOR comptroller with a baseline minimum amount for 
SOCKOR headquarters support requirements.  Although EUSA 
might approve requests for future headquarters support that 
exceed the amounts moved in PBD 081 for FY02-07, SOCKOR 
finally has visibility on a quantifiable amount of MFP-2 
funds available for SOCKOR headquarters costs.        
F. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND PACIFIC (SOCPAC) 
1. Theater Combatant Command Relationships 
SOCPAC is a sub-unified command of U.S. Pacific 
Command (USPACOM).  Figure 6 shows USPACOM organization. 
The Service executive agent for USPACOM headquarters 
requirements is the Department of the Navy.  Since DoDD 
5100.3 assigned headquarters support responsibility for 
combatant command subordinate joint commands to the same 
Service executive agent as the respective combatant command 
[Ref. 13:p. 2], the Navy O&M appropriation also funds 
SOCPAC headquarters support costs.  The MFP-2 funding for 
SOCPAC headquarters support requirements has a separate 
line item in the USPACOM budget.  This means the SOCPAC 
comptroller can easily identify MFP-2 funding budgeted for 
SOCPAC headquarters support.  [Ref. 30]   







































Figure 6. U.S. Pacific Command Organization.  
[From: Ref. 28] 
 
The SOCPAC comptroller staff has established an 
excellent working relationship with USPACOM comptrollers.  
This positive and professional atmosphere has eliminated 
most barriers between USPACOM and SOCPAC concerning funding 
SOCPAC headquarters support requirements.  However, this 
relationship is informal and could easily change if there 
are comptroller personnel changes at either command.  [Ref.  
30]  
2. Headquarters Support Funding Mechanism 
SOCPAC funds headquarters support costs by accepting 
Military Interdepartmental Purchase Requests (MIPRs) from 
USPACOM on a reimbursable basis.  At the beginning of each 
fiscal year, SOCPAC receives a MIPR for all budgeted 
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headquarters support costs for that year.  The SOCPAC 
comptroller then loads the MFP-2 dollars into the SOCPAC 
accounting system and draws off the balance to fund 
headquarters support requirements throughout the year.  The 
SOCPAC comptroller has the authority to ensure the MFP-2 
funds are used properly.  Additionally, the SOCPAC 
comptroller plans to submit input for the FY04 POM through 
USPACOM for future SOCPAC headquarters support.  [Ref. 30]    
3. SO-Peculiar vs. Headquarters Support 
Before and during FY00, SOCPAC did not separate SOCPAC 
headquarters support costs from SO-peculiar costs and 
funded any headquarters support requirements that were not 
covered by USPACOM with SOCPAC MFP-11 dollars.  To 
determine whether a cost is SO-peculiar, SOCPAC assesses 
whether the requirement is associated with deployment away 
from SOCPAC garrison headquarters.  Costs supporting 
deployments are SO-peculiar.  This covers all travel by 
SOCPAC personnel excluding Service-common schools.  SOCPAC 
uses MFP-11 dollars to finance these requirements.  Costs 
not associated with deployments are headquarters support 
costs.  After USSOCOM prohibited the theater SOCs from 
using MFP-11 dollars on non-SO-peculiar requirements in 
February 2001 [Ref. 18], SOCPAC began funding headquarters 
support cost with MFP-2 funds.  [Ref. 30]   
4. FY00 Funding Issues 
From the data in PBD 081, SOCPAC spent $710,000 of 
MFP-11 funds on headquarters support requirements in FY00.  
USPACOM financed $1,450,000 of FY00 SOCPAC headquarters 
support costs.  These requirements were funded by the Navy 
O&M appropriation through USPACOM.  Table 8 shows this 
funding summary.     
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            (Dollars in Thousands) 
Command             Navy        USSOCOM        Total 
SOCPAC    1,450           710        2,160 
 
Table 8. FY00 SOCPAC Direct Headquarters Support. 
[From: Ref. 12:p. 20] 
 
5. Consequences of PBD 081 
PBD 081 increased the MFP-2 funding available for 
SOCPAC headquarters support by moving $800,000 from USSOCOM 
to the Navy.  Table 3 in Chapter II shows this funding 
transfer.  Consequently, USSOCOM reduced SOCPAC MFP-11 
funds by this same amount.  Since SOCPAC previously had 
used MFP-11 dollars on headquarters support, the move and 
the reduction effectively cancelled each other out.   
The Navy distributed the funding move for FY02 SOCPAC 
headquarters support in PBD 081 through U.S. Pacific Fleet 
(USPACFLT).  USPACFLT is the Naval component command of 
USPACOM.  Although SOCPAC received the MFP-2 funds from 
USPACFLT via MIPR without issue, the Navy plans to 
distribute future funds for SOCPAC headquarters support 
through USPACOM.  In addition, USPACOM comptrollers have 
assured SOCPAC that they will not “tax” any portion of the 
MFP-2 funding.  [Ref. 30]  This means SOCPAC will receive 
100% of the amount USSOCOM reduced from SOCPAC MFP-11 funds 
back as MFP-2 funds for headquarters support costs. 
By identifying the funding move amount for SOCPAC 
headquarters costs, PBD 081 gave SOCPAC comptroller 
visibility of SOCPAC MFP-2 funding within the USPACOM 
headquarters support budget.  This means SOCPAC will have 
the opportunity to compete for future SOCPAC MFP-2 funding 
within USPACOM.  Given the close working relationship with 
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the USPACOM comptroller staff, the SOCPAC comptroller 
believes future SOCPAC headquarters support costs will be 
sufficiently funded with MFP-2 dollars through USPACOM.  
[Ref. 30]    
G. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND SOUTH (SOCSOUTH) 
1. Theater Combatant Command Relationships 
SOCSOUTH is a sub-unified command U.S. Southern 





























Figure 7. U.S. Southern Command Organization.   
[From: Ref. 31] 
 
The Service executive agent for USSOUTHCOM 
headquarters requirements is the Department of the Army.  
Since DoDD 5100.3 assigned headquarters support 
responsibility for combatant command subordinate joint 
commands to the same Service executive agent as the 
respective combatant command [Ref. 13:p. 2], the Army O&M 
appropriation also funds SOCSOUTH headquarters support 
costs.  The MFP-2 funding for SOCSOUTH headquarters support 
requirements is distributed through U.S. Army South 
(USARSO) and has a separate line item in the USARSO budget.  
This means the SOCSOUTH comptroller can easily identify 
MFP-2 funding budgeted for SOCSOUTH headquarters support.  
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USARSO also handles the headquarters support requirements 
for USSOUTHCOM.  [Ref. 32]   
The SOCSOUTH comptroller has continued a long-standing 
cohesive and productive working relationship with the 
USARSO comptroller staff.  Thus, there are virtually no 
barriers between USARSO and SOCSOUTH concerning funding 
SOCSOUTH headquarters support requirements.  There is no 
formal instruction defining this process because, “…this is 
the way the Army takes care of things [headquarters 
support] within SOUTHCOM.”  [Ref. 32]  Additionally, the 
USARSO deputy comptroller is a civilian that has previously 
worked for USARSO in a military capacity and has maintained 
a close relationship with SOCSOUTH.  However, this 
arrangement could easily change if there are personnel 
changes at either command.  [Ref. 32]   
2. Headquarters Support Funding Mechanism 
SOCSOUTH receives MFP-2 funding for budgeted 
headquarters support requirements through a FAD from USARSO 
on a quarterly basis.  The SOCSOUTH comptroller believes 
that USARSO “taxes” all MFP-2 funds by about 30%.  This 
“tax” is kept by USARSO and never distributed to SOCSOUTH, 
yet has not prevented SOCSOUTH from fully funding its 
headquarters support costs.  The SOCSOUTH comptroller 
executes the SOCSOUTH budget and spends MFP-2 dollars on 
headquarters support costs.  Additionally, the SOCSOUTH 
comptroller regularly participates in the USARSO POM 
process to procure funding for future SOCSOUTH headquarters 
support requirements.  [Ref. 32]    
3. SO-Peculiar vs. Headquarters Support 
SOCSOUTH has no formal instruction or method to 
separate SO-peculiar requirements from headquarters support 
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costs.  The SOCSOUTH comptroller relies on historical data 
and common sense for determining which costs are for 
headquarters support and require MFP-2 funding.  Examples 
include headquarters computers, common supplies, and 
maintenance.  MFP-11 dollars are used for SO-peculiar 
equipment, travel and training.  After sending SOCSOUTH the 
MFP-2 FAD each quarter, USARSO does not question SOCSOUTH 
MFP-2 spending on budgeted headquarters support costs.  
[Ref. 32] 
4. FY00 Funding Issues 
From the data in PBD 081, SOCSOUTH did not spend any 
MFP-11 funds on headquarters support requirements in FY00.  
The Army O&M appropriation financed all $3,851,000 of 
SOCSOUTH FY00 headquarters support with MFP-2 funds 
distributed through USARSO.  Table 9 shows this funding 
summary.     
 
            (Dollars in Thousands) 
Command             Army        USSOCOM        Total 
SOCSOUTH        3,851             0        3,851 
 
Table 9. FY00 SOCSOUTH Direct Headquarters Support.  
[From: Ref. 12:p. 20] 
 
5. Consequences of PBD 081 
PBD 081 had no impact on SOCSOUTH.  The SOCSOUTH 
comptroller already had been separating SO-peculiar 
requirements from headquarters support requirements and had 
spent no MFP-11 funds on headquarters support in FY00.  
Thus, PBD 081 did not move any funds from USSOCOM to the 
Army for SOCSOUTH headquarters support and USSOCOM did not 
alter the SOCSOUTH MFP-11 budget.   
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H. SUMMARY 
Each geographic theater presents unique requirements 
and challenges.  The theater combatant commands have 
tailored staff relationships and procedures around the 
necessities and nuances of the regions.  To ensure 
financial transactions occur in a timely and proper 
fashion, formal guidelines and documents are essential.  
Although PBD 081 identified Service executive agents as the 
source of theater special operations command headquarters 
support funding, the decision did not clarify or formalize 
the distribution route for theater SOC MFP-2 dollars.   
The ambiguity of the funding mechanism for theater SOC 
headquarters support requirements allowed the theater SOCs 
to develop unique scenarios for financing headquarters 
support costs.  The funding relationships are not 
formalized at the theater combatant command level and are 
often driven by Service culture and comptroller 
proclivities.  Thus, many of the theater SOC MFP-2 funding 
arrangements could change because of personnel rotations on 
the theater combatant command staff or the theater SOC 
staff.  Table 10 compares the headquarters support funding 
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 SOCCENT SOCEUR SOCJFCOM SOCKOR SOCPAC SOCSOUTH 
Combatant 
Command USCENTCOM USEUCOM USJFCOM USPACOM USPACOM USSOUTHCOM 
Service EA Air Force Army Navy Army Navy Army 
Formal MFP-2 
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POM Input  
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SO vs. HQ 
Method  
Pre-PBD 081 
























on HQ Costs 
(Thousands) 
$353 $517 $710 $99 $710 None 
FY00 MFP-2 
on HQ Costs 
(Thousands)  




$800 $500 $700 $100 $800 None 
MFP-2 Tax by 
Distribution 
Command 
16% None 5% None None 30% 
PBD 081 Move 
Impact on 
MFP-11 Fund  
None Reduce 20% 
Reduce 
5% None None None 
 
Table 10. Comparison of Theater SOC Headquarters Support 
Funding. 
 
Significant variations among the theater SOCs include 
that: 
· MFP-2 funds come from different Service executive 
agent appropriations; 
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· The respective theater combatant command does not 
distribute MFP-2 funding for SOCCENT, SOCKOR and 
SOCSOUTH; 
· Each theater SOC receives its MFP-2 funding via 
six different distribution mechanisms: quarterly 
OBADs, cost transfer per item, annual control 
numbers, FAD per item, annual MIPRs and quarterly 
FADs; 
· The respective distribution command “taxes” MFP-2 
funding for SOCCENT and SOCSOUTH and imposes a 
“withhold” on SOCJFCOM MFP-2 funding; 
· The MFP-2 dollars for SOCEUR, SOCJFCOM and SOCKOR 
do not have identifiable funding lines in the 
budgets of the respective distribution commands; 
· Before spending any MFP-2 dollars, the 
comptrollers for SOCEUR, SOCJFCOM and SOCKOR must 
obtain approval from the respective distribution 
command; 
· SOCCENT and SOCEUR do not have a formal way to 
participate in the POM process for future 
headquarters support funding. 
PBD 081 did not solve the budget shortfalls in issues 
relating to the funding mechanism for theater SOC 
headquarters support.  In the following chapter, an 
analysis of potential alternative funding mechanisms to 
formalize this arrangement and make clear the distribution 
routes from the source to the theater SOCs is presented.         
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IV. ALTERNATIVES FOR FUNDING THEATER SOC 
HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT COSTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There are numerous variations in the procedures for 
funding theater special operations command (SOC) 
headquarters support costs.  This chapter will analyze 
three alternative funding mechanisms in separate sections.  
Each section will first describe the alternative.  Next, it 
will analyze the effect of the alternative funding method 
on reducing the theater SOC variations identified in 
Chapter III.  This analysis will include the requirements 
for implementing the alternative and any remaining barriers 
to change the alternative would encounter.  Each section 
will then look at the financial impact of the alternative 
on budgets and appropriations linked to theater SOC 
headquarters support.  Finally, this chapter will summarize 
the alternative funding mechanisms in a comparison table.  
B. ALTERNATIVE NUMBER 1: USSOCOM MFP-2 ACCOUNT  
1. Funding Mechanism 
The first alternative funding mechanism would be to 
insert U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) into the 
distribution chain for theater SOC headquarters support 
funding by establishing a Major Force Program (MFP)-2 
account at USSOCOM.  The funds would flow from the Service 
appropriations to the USSOCOM MFP-2 account.  Subsequently, 
USSOCOM would distribute the MFP-2 dollars to the theater 
SOCs for headquarters support costs.  USSOCOM could 
distribute the MFP-2 funds to the theater SOCs using 
quarterly Funding Authorization Documents (FADs).  This 
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procedure would mirror the mechanism USSOCOM currently uses 
to distribute theater SOC MFP-11 dollars.   
The theater SOCs would also submit future headquarters 
support requirements directly to USSOCOM for participation 
in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process.  Since 
the MFP-2 dollars would still come from Service Operations 
and Maintenance (O&M) appropriations, USSOCOM would have to 
group the theater SOC inputs by assigned Service executive 
agent and then make separate POM submissions to the three 
Services.  For example, USSOCOM would combine inputs for 
future headquarters support costs from Special Operations 
Command Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM) and Special 
Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) to make a single 
submission to the Department of the Navy.    
2. Effect on Reducing Theater SOC Variations  
Alternative No. 1 would eliminate almost all the 
existing variations in the theater SOC funding mechanisms 
identified in Chapter III.  Although the three Service O&M 
appropriations would remain as the sources of funding 
theater SOC headquarters support costs, all MFP-2 funds 
would now be distributed to the theater SOCs through a 
single command: USSOCOM.  If USSOCOM distributes the MFP-2 
dollars using FADs on a quarterly basis, the theater SOCs 
would receive their funding in a uniform manner.  The 
quarterly FAD distribution would also eliminate any 
requirement for theater SOC comptrollers to seek approval 
from USSOCOM on individual headquarters support 
requirements.  The theater SOC comptrollers would manage 
theater SOC MFP-2 dollars the same way USSOCOM currently 
allows the comptrollers to manage theater SOC MFP-11 
dollars.  
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Significantly, USSOCOM currently does not create a 
reserve by “taxing” the MFP-11 dollars that it distributes 
to the theater SOCs.  [Ref. 11]  If theater SOC MFP-2 
funding also flows through USSOCOM, these funds would not 
be subject to the “taxes” or “withholds” imposed by the 
distribution commands identified in Chapter III.  This 
means the theater SOCs would receive more MFP-2 funding for 
headquarters support requirements.  In the case of SOCCENT, 
however, the Department of the Air Force creates a reserve 
at the Service level.  Consequently, SOCCENT MFP-2 funds 
would probably still be reduced.   
In addition, USSOCOM would have the authority to give 
each theater SOC headquarters support budget an 
identifiable funding line within the USSOCOM MFP-2 account.  
Thus, all theater SOC comptrollers would now have 
visibility of their headquarters support budgets.  This 
alternative also clearly defines the submission process for 
future theater SOC headquarters support requirements.  
USSOCOM would now be the advocate for theater SOC 
headquarters support costs at the Service level.   
3. Implementation Requirements 
To implement Alternative No. 1, Under Secretary of 
Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C)) would have to issue a 
Program Budget Decision (PBD) that established an MFP-2 
account for USSOCOM and that redefined the flow of MFP-2 
funds for theater SOC headquarters support costs.  Thus, 
the PBD would have to direct the Services to distribute 
theater SOC headquarters support funding from Service O&M 
appropriations to USSOCOM.  [Ref. 33] 
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PBD 081 (December 2000) directed an amendment to 
Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5100.3 that stated, 
“…the provision of such funding [theater SOC headquarters 
support costs] is the responsibility of the Theater CINC to 
which the SOC is assigned.”  [Ref. 12:p. 20]  For this 
reason, a PBD that implemented Alternative No. 1 also must 
direct another amendment to DoDD 5100.3 that explicitly 
states that the provision of funding theater SOC 
headquarters support costs is the responsibility of the 
Service executive agent through USSOCOM.  [Ref. 33]  All 
citations of PBD 081 in this chapter refer to PBD 081 
issued in December 2000 
4. Barriers to Change 
There is no legal restriction prohibiting USSOCOM from 
receiving MFP-2 funding from the Service O&M appropriations 
for distribution to the theater SOCs.  [Ref. 10]  However, 
funding traditionally flows along command organizational 
lines.  The theater SOCs are subordinate unified (sub-
unified) commands of the theater combatant commands, not of 
USSOCOM.  Thus, because there is no organizational 
relationship between USSOCOM and the theater SOCs, 
Alternative No. 1 may create unanticipated issues between 
USSOCOM and the theater SOCs in managing and budgeting 
theater SOC headquarters support funding.  For example, if 
the USSOCOM and the theater SOCs disagreed about spending 
MFP-2 dollars on a particular requirement, there would be 
no mechanism in place to resolve this difference.  
Significantly, USSOCOM does distribute MFP-11 dollars to 
the theater SOCs without an organizational relationship in 
place to act as an enforcement tool for budgetary issues.  
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This is because Section 167 of Title 10, U.S. Code gives 
USSOCOM,  
…authority, direction, and control over the 
expenditure of [MFP-11] funds – … (ii) for 
special operations forces assigned to unified 
combatant commands other than the special 
operations command…  [Ref. 5:p. 100] 
 
This authority allows USSOCOM to resolve any MFP-11 
funding issues that may surface with the theater SOCs, but 
does not extend to MFP-2 funds.  Therefore, changing the 
path of theater SOC MFP-2 dollars without changing theater 
SOC command relationships could create budget challenges 
that do not exist with MFP-11 dollars. 
5. Financial Impact 
Alternative No. 1 would not immediately affect Service 
O&M appropriations.  This alternative preserves the 
executive agent responsibilities for theater SOC 
headquarters support costs that the existing DoDD 5100.3 
(November 1999) assigned to the Services.  For that reason, 
the Services would still finance theater SOC headquarters 
support.  However, the POM input for future theater SOC 
headquarters support requirements would now come through 
USSOCOM to the appropriate supporting Service.  USSOCOM 
previously has not participated in the POM process for 
Service appropriations.  Thus, procedures for this 
mechanism would have to be defined and established. 
Creating an MFP-2 account at USSOCOM would mean that 
commands currently distributing theater SOC MFP-2 funds 
would no longer receive that MFP-2 funding from the Service 
executive agent.  For example, because U.S. Joint Forces 
Command (USJFCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) 
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receive funding for theater SOC headquarters support as 
part of their own MFP-2 funding from the Navy O&M 
appropriation, both unified commands would now receive 
fewer MFP-2 dollars from the Navy.  Instead, the Navy would 
combine the SOCJFCOM MFP-2 funds with the SOCPAC MFP-2 
funds and send a single funding transfer to the new USSOCOM 
MFP-2 account.  USJFCOM and USPACOM would also not 
incorporate theater SOC headquarters support into future 
POM inputs for MFP-2 funding.  Using Fiscal Year 2000 
(FY00) data from PBD 081, Table 11 shows this funding 
summary. 
 
                                     (Dollars in Thousands) 
Distribution Command (Theater SOC)             MFP-2 Budget 
 
Headquarters, Eleventh Wing (SOCCENT)                 - 778 
USEUCOM (SOCEUR)                                    - 3,851 
USJFCOM (SOCJFCOM)                                  - 2,160 
Eighth U.S. Army (SOCKOR)                           - 1,537 
USPACOM (SOCPAC)                                    - 2,437 
U.S. Army South (SOCSOUTH)                          - 1,900 
Total                                              - 12,699 
USSOCOM                                            + 12,699 
 
Table 11. Alternative No. 1 MFP-2 Funding Summary. 
[From: Ref. 12:p. 20] 
 
Additionally, managing an MFP-2 account would be a new 
undertaking for USSOCOM.  Budget officials and comptrollers 
would have to become knowledgeable on the MFP-2 financial 
process and on the POM submission process of the Army, Navy 
and Air Force.  This could lead to the hiring of more 
comptrollers at USSOCOM, increased financial training and a 
significant workload increase at USSOCOM.  [Ref. 20] 
 
 
  59 
C.  ALTERNATIVE NUMBER 2: SEPARATE THEATER SOC PE NUMBER 
1. Funding Mechanism 
The second alternative would be to send MFP-2 funding 
for theater SOC headquarters support through the respective 
theater combatant command.  In addition, this alternative 
would direct the Service executive agents to assign a 
separate Program Element (PE) number for theater SOC 
headquarters support.  The funds would flow from Service 
appropriations to theater combatant command MFP-2 accounts.  
The theater combatant command would then distribute the 
MFP-2 dollars to the theater SOC by the traditional 
mechanism used by that particular theater combatant 
command. 
Additionally, the theater SOCs would submit their 
input for future headquarters support to the respective 
theater combatant command for participation in the POM 
process.  The theater combatant command would then be the 
advocate for theater SOC headquarters support funding from 
the assigned Service executive agent appropriation.  For 
example, USJFCOM would include SOCJFCOM input for future 
headquarters support requirements as a separate budget item 
within the USJFCOM funding request to the Department of the 
Navy.  Subsequently, the Navy would identify the O&M 
funding for SOCJFCOM headquarters support by a PE number 
and would distribute the funding to USJFCOM.  The USJFCOM 
comptrollers would then decide how to distribute the 
funding to SOCJFCOM.    
2. Effect on Reducing Theater SOC Variations 
Alternative No. 2 affects some of the theater SOC 
variations identified in Chapter III.  The three Service 
O&M appropriations would remain the sources of theater SOC 
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headquarters support funding and all the theater SOCs would 
receive their MFP-2 dollars through the respective theater 
combatant commands.  The theater combatant commands would 
distribute MFP-2 dollars according to their own preferences 
and would be able to create reserves through “taxes” or 
“withholds” on theater SOC headquarters support funding.  
This means the theater SOCs would receive their MFP-2 
dollars by various distribution mechanisms and these funds 
could be reduced by the respective theater combatant 
command.  Significantly, however, the PE numbers would give 
theater SOC comptrollers the capability to track their 
headquarters support budgets from the POM input process 
through fund distribution during the entire fiscal year.   
Since Alternative No. 2 places the theater combatant 
commands in the distribution chain for theater SOC MFP-2 
funding, approval for theater SOC comptrollers to spend the 
MFP-2 dollars on theater SOC headquarters support would 
still be at the discretion of theater combatant command.  
In addition, this alternative designates the theater 
combatant command as the advocate for theater SOC 
headquarters support funding during the POM process.   
3. Implementation Requirements 
To implement Alternative No. 2, USD(C) would have to 
issue a PBD that defined the flow of theater SOC 
headquarters support funding.  Thus, the PBD would have to 
direct the Service executive agents to distribute theater 
SOC MFP-2 funds from Service O&M appropriations to the 
proper theater combatant commands.  [Ref. 33]  DoDD 5100.3 
also would have to be amended in accordance with the 
guidance from PBD 081.  Specifically, PBD 081 directed the 
amendment for DoDD 5100.3 to read, “…the provision of such 
  61 
funding [theater SOC headquarters support costs] is the 
responsibility of the Theater CINC to which the SOC is 
assigned.” [Ref. 12:p. 20]  DoDD 5100.3 remains unamended 
and thus does not provide an enforcement tool that would 
require the theater combatant commands to provide theater 
SOC headquarters support funding.   
Further, the amendment of DoDD 5100.3 would have to 
direct the Service executive agents to assign separate PE 
numbers in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to O&M 
funding provided to the theater combatant commands for 
theater SOC headquarters support.  In May 2002, a 
memorandum from USD(C) stated,  
The CINC [Commander in Chief] FYDP visibility can 
be most efficiently achieved by using the 
existing Program Element structure and assigning 
attributes to the CINC O&M funding.  Beginning 
with the FY 2004 Program and Budget Review 
submission, all Components are to use the 
attribute methodology to provide visibility in 
the FYDP for all CINC direct O&M funding.  [Ref. 
34] 
Accordingly, the Services now assign PE numbers in the 
FYDP to any O&M funding provided for theater combatant 
command headquarters support.  For example, the Navy now 
assigns separate PE numbers to “JFCOM HQ” (USJFCOM 
headquarters support) and to “CINCPAC HQ” (USPACOM 
headquarters support).  [Ref. 35]  The headquarters support 
funds for SOCJFCOM and SOCPAC, however, are still included 
under the PE number assigned to the respective theater 
combatant command headquarters support.  Thus, the 
amendment to DoDD 5100.3 in Alternative No. 2 would extend 
this FYDP visibility to the theater SOCs by requiring the 
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Navy to assign PE numbers to SOCJFCOM headquarters support 
funds and SOCPAC headquarters support funds.  
4. Barriers to Change 
There are no legal obstacles to Alternative No. 2.  
Any resistance to implementing this alternative would 
probably come from the theater combatant commands.  [Ref. 
10]  The theater combatant commands for Special Operations 
Command Central (SOCCENT), Special Operations Command Korea 
(SOCKOR) and Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH) 
currently do not participate in the distribution chain or 
in the POM process for theater SOC headquarters support 
costs.  Those commands may surface issues associated with 
the additional financial and personnel burdens of managing 
theater SOC MFP-2 funds.  
Additionally, the data from PBD 081 shows SOCSOUTH 
spent no MFP-11 dollars on headquarters support 
requirements in FY00.  Further analysis in Chapter III 
shows the SOCSOUTH funding mechanism is informal, yet 
effective.  Thus, implementing this Alternative No. 2 could 
have unanticipated consequences for SOCSOUTH.   
5. Financial Impact 
Alternative No. 2 would not immediately affect Service 
O&M appropriations.  This alternative preserves the 
executive agent responsibilities that the existing DoDD 
5100.3 (November 1999) assigned to the Services.  For that 
reason, the Services would still finance theater SOC 
headquarters support.  However, because the distribution 
and POM input process paths would change for SOCCENT, 
SOCKOR and SOCSOUTH, the MFP-2 budgets of the respective 
distribution commands and the theater combatant commands 
also would change.  One notable exception would be SOCKOR.  
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To keep SOCKOR executive agent responsibility with the 
Department of the Army, SOCKOR MFP-2 funds would flow 
through U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).  Using FY00 data from PBD 
081, Table 12 shows this funding summary. 
In addition, all theater SOC headquarters support 
budgets may be significantly affected by this alternative.  
If the Services assign separate PE numbers to theater SOC 
headquarters support costs in the FYDP, these requirements 
will now be competing with the other priorities of the 
theater combatant commands.  Although theater SOC 
comptrollers will have visibility of these budgets, there 
is a chance that other theater requirements would eclipse 
theater SOC headquarters support and leave the theater SOCs 
struggling for MFP-2 funding.  
 
                                     (Dollars in Thousands) 
Distribution Command (Theater SOC)             MFP-2 Budget 
 
Headquarters, Eleventh Wing (SOCCENT)                 - 778  
Eighth U.S. Army (SOCKOR)                           - 1,537 
U.S. Army South (SOCSOUTH)                          - 1,900   
Total                                               - 4,215 
 
USCENTCOM (SOCCENT)                                   + 778 
USFK (SOCKOR)                                       + 1,537 
USSOUTHCOM (SOCSOUTH)                               + 1,900 
Total                                               + 4,215 
 
Table 12. Alternative No. 2 MFP-2 Funding Summary.  
[From: Ref. 12:p. 20] 
 
D. ALTERNATIVE NUMBER 3: THEATER SOCS USE MFP-11 FUNDS 
1. Funding Mechanism 
The third alternative would be to allow the theater 
SOCs to use MFP-11 dollars to pay for headquarters support 
requirements.  The funds would flow through USSOCOM and 
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directly to the theater SOCs in quarterly FADS.  Theater 
SOC headquarters support funding would mesh together with 
the existing funding mechanism in place for MFP-11 funds 
currently distributed for SO–peculiar requirements.  Thus, 
the theater SOCs would receive one MFP-11 distribution each 
quarter for all requirements.     
2. Effect on Reducing Theater SOC Variations 
Alternative No. 3 would eliminate all variations in 
the theater SOC funding mechanisms for headquarters support 
costs identified in Chapter III.  Service O&M 
appropriations would no longer be the source of theater SOC 
headquarters support funding: all theater SOC funding would 
come from the USSOCOM O&M, Defense-wide (DW) appropriation.  
Since USSOCOM currently does not create a reserve from the 
MFP-11 dollars it distributes to the theater SOCs [Ref. 
11], theater SOC headquarters support funds would not be 
subject to the “taxes” or “withholds” imposed by the 
current distribution commands identified in Chapter III.  
This means all theater SOCs would receive headquarters 
support funding without reductions. 
Additionally, USSOCOM could maintain the existing MFP-
11 distribution mechanism of issuing FADs to the theater 
SOCs on a quarterly basis.  Quarterly FADs eliminate the 
requirement for theater SOC comptrollers to seek approval 
for individual headquarters support requirements and allows 
theater SOC comptrollers to manage all theater SOC funding.  
Theater SOC MFP-11 dollars already have identifiable 
funding lines within the USSOCOM MFP-11 budget.  This 
alternative ensures theater SOC comptrollers have 
visibility of all theater SOC funding and have USSOCOM as 
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an advocate for all funding requirements during the POM 
process.   
3. Implementation Requirements 
To implement Alternative No. 3, USD(C) would have to 
issue a PBD that realigned theater SOC headquarters support 
funding from the Service O&M appropriations to the USSOCOM 
O&M, DW appropriation.  Additionally, this PBD would have 
to direct USSOCOM to distribute this supplementary funding 
to the theater SOCs for headquarters support requirements.    
USD(C) would also have to change the funding 
responsibilities in DoDD 5100.3.  The directive currently 
states,  
…the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Special 
Operations Command shall program and budget for 
the SO-peculiar [special operations-peculiar] 
support of the headquarters of the theater 
Special Operations Commands and other joint 
special operations commands established within 
the Combatant Commands…the supporting Military 
Departments shall program and budget for the 
Service-common support of these joint SO 
headquarters.  [Ref. 13:p. 3]  
Thus, DoDD 5100.3 would have to be amended to state 
that USSOCOM shall also program and budget for theater SOC 
headquarters support requirements for which funds have been 
transferred from the Services to USSOCOM.     
4. Barriers to Change 
Alternative No. 3 would face significant legal and 
philosophical obstacles.  Chapter II listed the uses of 
MFP-11 dollars from Section 167 of Title 10, U.S. Code to 
include, “…developing and acquiring special operations-
peculiar equipment and acquiring special operations-
peculiar material, supplies and services.”  [Ref. 5:p. 103]  
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Amending DoDD 5100.3 to add theater SOC headquarters 
support costs to USSOCOM responsibilities implies USSOCOM 
would use MFP-11 funds for theater SOC headquarters 
support.  This means theater SOC headquarter support costs 
would be considered “special operations-peculiar” (SO-
peculiar).  However, Joint Publication 3-05 defines “SO-
peculiar” as, 
Equipment, material, supplies, and services 
required for special operations mission support 
for which there is no broad conventional 
requirement.  This includes the standard items 
used by other DOD forces but modified for special 
operations forces (SOF); items initially designed 
for, or used by, SOF until adapted for use as 
Service-common by other DOD forces; and items 
approved by the Commander in Chief, US Special 
Operations Command (USCINCSOC) as critically 
urgent for the immediate accomplishment of a 
special operations mission but not normally 
procured by USCINCSOC,  [Ref. 6:p. GL-10]  
Although an argument could be made that theater SOC 
headquarters support costs are “equipment, material, 
supplies, and services required for special operations 
mission support,” headquarters support costs also have 
conventional requirements.  For example, the secure local 
area network (SLAN) computer system installed at Special 
Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) is used by SO personnel 
and directly supports SO missions.  However, there is also 
a conventional requirement for the SLAN throughout the 
military.  Thus, the SLAN is not “SO-peculiar” and one 
legal interpretation is that MFP-11 dollars should not pay 
for the SLAN.   
To contend that “SO-peculiar” is contingent upon the 
activity being performed or the personnel that require the 
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support would be redefining “SO-peculiar” differently from 
existing legal guidance.  Consequently, amending the 
definition of “SO-peculiar” to incorporate theater SOC 
headquarters support costs may require changing U.S. Code 
and Joint Publication 3-05.               
In addition, funding theater SOC headquarters support 
with MFP-11 dollars means that all theater SOC funding 
would come from USSOCOM.  This means that all theater SOC 
funding would flow without corresponding command 
relationships.  Section 167 of Title 10, U.S. Code gives 
USSOCOM, 
 …authority, direction, and control over the 
expenditure of [MFP-11] funds – … (ii) for 
special operations forces assigned to unified 
combatant commands other than the special 
operations command…  [Ref. 5:p. 100]   
Although this authority allows USSOCOM to resolve any 
MFP-11 funding issues that may surface with the theater 
SOCs, the theater SOCs are sub-unified commands of the 
theater combatant command, not of USSOCOM. 
Thus, Alternative No. 3 would create an environment in 
which the theater SOCs work directly for the theater 
combatant commands, yet receive all financial support from 
a different unified command: USSOCOM.  This situation could 
precipitate unanticipated issues between the theater 
combatant commands and USSOCOM on theater SOC funding and 
resource allocation.  The theater SOCs would be caught in 
the middle if problems arose.   
5. Financial Impact 
Alternative No. 3 would directly affect the Service 
O&M appropriations and the USSOCOM O&M, DW appropriation.  
  68 
This alternative eliminates the executive agent 
responsibilities for theater SOC headquarters support 
requirements that the existing DoDD 5100.3 (November 1999) 
assigned to the Services and transfers these duties to 
USSOCOM.  For this reason, the Services would no longer 
finance theater SOC headquarters support costs from Service 
O&M appropriations.  In addition, POM input for future 
theater SOC headquarters support would come from the 
theater SOCs and feed directly into the USSOCOM O&M, DW 
appropriation.   
Transferring this financial responsibility from the 
Services to USSOCOM would mean identifying the total 
theater SOC headquarters support funding currently in 
Service O&M appropriations.  Subsequently, USD(C) would 
have to move those funds from the Services to USSOCOM 
through a PBD.  For example, SOCJFCOM and SOCPAC spent a 
total (Service MFP-2 dollars and USSOCOM MFP-11 dollars) of 
$4,060,000 on headquarters support costs in FY00.  [Ref. 
12: p.20]  Alternative No. 3 would move this amount from 
the Department of the Navy to USSOCOM.  Alternative No. 3 
would also implement similar moves from the Army and the 
Air Force to USSOCOM.  Using FY00 data from PBD 081, Table 
13 shows this funding summary. 
In addition, the funding moves implemented by PBD 081 
spanned FY02-07.  The moves described in Alternative No. 3 
should also span six fiscal years to ensure the changes in 
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                                     (Dollars in Thousands)  
Appropriation                Amount     
 
O&M – Army                                          - 7,861   
    - SOCEUR                     - 2,473   
    - SOCKOR                                        - 1,537   
    - SOCSOUTH                                      - 3,851 
 
O&M – Navy                                          - 4,060 
    - SOCJFCOM                                      - 1,900 
    - SOCPAC                                        - 2,160  
 
O&M – Air Force                                       - 778 
    - SOCCENT                                         - 778 
 
O&M, DW - USSOCOM                                  + 12,699  
 
Table 13. Alternative No. 3 Funding Summary.  
[From: Ref. 12:p. 20] 
 
E. SUMMARY  
This chapter presented three alternatives for funding 
headquarters support costs at theater special operations 
commands.  Although the alternatives have several 
commonalities, the analysis also revealed significant 
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Table 14. Comparison of Theater SOC Headquarters Support 
Funding Alternatives. 
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Commonalities among the alternatives:  
· Eliminate ambiguity by formalizing the funding 
mechanism for theater SOC headquarters support 
costs; 
· Provide identifiable funding lines for theater 
SOC headquarters support costs; 
· Provide a path to participate in the POM process 
for theater SOC headquarters support costs. 
Variations among the funding alternatives: 
· Appropriation for funding theater SOC 
headquarters support requirements; 
· Distribution commands for headquarters support 
funds; 
· Creation of reserves through “taxes” or 
“withholds” by the distribution command; 
· Distribution mechanisms for headquarters support 
funds; 
· Approval requirements for spending theater SOC 
headquarters support funds; 
· Implementation requirements for the alternative; 
· Barriers to changing to the alternative; 
· Financial impact of the alternative. 
Further, the differences in the alternatives condense 
to three categories: effect on reducing the theater SOC 
variations identified in Chapter III, barriers to 
implementation and financial impact.  Table 15 ranks the 
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Middle Lowest Highest 
Barriers to 
Implementation Middle Lowest Highest 
Financial 
Impact Middle Lowest Highest 
 
Table 15. Ranking of Theater SOC Headquarters Support 
Funding Alternatives. 
 
From Table 15, one trend clearly emerges: the effect 
the alternative has on reducing the theater SOC variations 
identified in Chapter III is directly proportional to the 
barriers for implementation and the financial impact of the 
alternative.  This means that the more standardized across 
the theater SOCs the alternative makes this funding 
mechanism, the greater the implementation obstacles and the 
more substantial the ensuing financial impact. 
All of the alternatives appear to be improvements over 
the existing funding mechanism for theater SOC headquarters 
support costs.  None of the alternatives will please all of 
the stakeholders involved.  However, each of these three 
formal funding arrangements provides an enforcement tool 
that ensures the theater SOCs have a clearly defined 
mechanism to resource their headquarters support 
requirements.  The following chapter will present the best 
alternative. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The current funding mechanism for theater special 
operations command (SOC) headquarters support costs is 
inadequately supported by legal guidance.  As explained in 
Chapter II, existing legislation and policy documents do 
not formalize theater SOC funding relationships to provide 
an enforcement tool that ensures the theater SOCs can 
properly resource their headquarters support requirements.  
The comparative analysis of the six theater SOCs made in 
Chapter III showed that the ambiguity of this funding 
mechanism allowed the theater SOCs to develop unique 
scenarios for financing headquarters support.  
Subsequently, Chapter IV presented and analyzed three 
funding alternatives.   
This chapter will conclude that the best alternative 
for funding theater SOC headquarters support costs from the 
options presented in Chapter IV is Alternative No. 2: 
assign separate Program Element (PE) numbers to theater SOC 
headquarters support funding and distribute the funds 
through the respective theater combatant commands.  Next, 
this chapter will draw additional general conclusions from 
the analysis conducted during this research.  Finally, this 
chapter will answer the research questions listed in 
Chapter I and will suggest areas of further study 
associated with this thesis.      
B. SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS  
All three alternatives presented in Chapter IV would 
formalize the funding mechanism for theater SOC 
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headquarters support costs.  However, the Chapter IV 
summary also identified a relation between the effect of 
the alternative on reducing variations among theater SOC 
funding mechanisms and the barriers to implementation and 
financial impact of the alternative.  This means that the 
more standardized across the theater SOCs the selected 
alternative makes the funding mechanism, the greater the 
implementation obstacles and the more substantial the 
ensuing financial impact.  Therefore, since all three 
alternatives would improve the existing theater SOC funding 
mechanism for headquarters support by formalizing the 
process, the best choice is the option that would face the 
lowest implementation obstacles and would cause the minimum 
financial impact: Alternative No. 2. 
Alternative No. 2 would mandate that the Services 
assign separate PE numbers to theater SOC headquarters 
support in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) and 
distribute theater SOC Major Force Program (MFP)-2 funds 
through the respective theater combatant commands.  To 
implement Alternative No. 2, Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller) (USD(C)) would have to issue a Program Budget 
Decision (PBD) that defined the flow of theater SOC 
headquarters support funding.  Thus, the PBD would have to 
direct the Service executive agents to distribute theater 
SOC MFP-2 funds from Service Operations and Maintenance 
(O&M) appropriations to the proper theater combatant 
commands.  [Ref. 33]  Department of Defense Directive 
(DoDD) 5100.3 also would have to be amended in accordance 
with the guidance from PBD 081.  All citations of PBD 081 
in this chapter refer to PBD 081 issued in December 2000.  
Specifically, PBD 081 directed the amendment for DoDD 
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5100.3 to read, “…the provision of such funding [theater 
SOC headquarters support costs] is the responsibility of 
the Theater CINC to which the SOC is assigned.” [Ref. 12:p. 
20]      
Alternative No. 2 would not eliminate all variations 
among the theater SOCs identified in Chapter III.  The 
specific surviving variations are described in Chapter IV, 
Section B, Sub-section 2.  Significantly, Alternative No. 2 
would allow the Services and the theater combatant commands 
to create reserves through “taxes” or “withholds” on 
theater SOC headquarters support funds.  However, the 
amount of the ”taxes” or “withholds” could vary across the 
Services and the combatant commands.  This means the 
theater SOCs might receive different percentages of the 
MFP-2 dollars intended for headquarters support funding in 
the Service O&M appropriations.   
Alternative No. 2, however, would distribute theater 
SOC MFP-2 funding along command organization paths.  
Recalling from Chapter II that the theater SOCs, except 
Special Operations Command Korea (SOCKOR), are subordinate 
unified (sub-unified) commands of the theater combatant 
commands, this option would position the theater combatant 
commands to resolve budget issues surrounding theater SOC 
headquarters support.  Thus, the budget authority for 
theater SOC headquarters support would be in alignment with 
theater SOC command authority.     
In summary, Alternative No. 2 is the best option for 
four reasons: 
· Alternative No. 2 formalizes the funding 
mechanism for theater SOC headquarters support 
requirements; 
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· Alternative No. 2 faces the lowest barriers to 
implementation among the three alternatives; 
· Alternative No. 2 causes the minimum financial 
impact among the three alternatives; 
· Alternative No. 2 aligns budget authority for 
theater SOC headquarters support with theater SOC 
command authority. 
C.  GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
Alternative No. 2, which would assign separate PE 
numbers to theater SOC headquarters support funding and 
would distribute the funds through the respective theater 
combatant commands, is the best alternative funding 
mechanism for theater SOC headquarters support 
requirements.  Ambiguity and lack of formalized funding 
responsibilities for theater SOC headquarters support 
precipitated the need for identifying this alternative.  
However, budget issues caused by inadequate legal guidance 
may not be exclusive to the theater SOCs.  Other commands 
may face similar issues surrounding the interpretation of 
funding mechanisms or financial responsibilities.   
In these situations, five questions from this research 
provide information for analysis in selecting an 
alternative funding mechanism: 
· Does the alternative formalize the funding 
mechanism? 
· Does the alternative standardize the funding 
mechanism? 
· What are the barriers to change for the 
alternative? 
· What is the financial impact of the alternative? 
· Does the alternative place the funding mechanism 
in alignment with command authority? 
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Every funding situation will be unique.  These 
questions are not comprehensive metrics for identifying 
alternative funding mechanisms.  Rather, they are suggested 
to establish a baseline for further analysis.  
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What Is the Best Alternative for Funding Theater 
SOC Headquarters Support Costs? 
Chapter IV analyzed three alternative funding 
mechanisms for theater SOC headquarters support costs.  
Alternative No. 2, which would mandate that the Services 
assign separate PE numbers to theater SOC headquarters 
support in the FYDP and distribute the funds through the 
respective theater combatant commands, is the best option.  
Section B of this chapter provides additional support for 
this conclusion. 
2. How Do the Theater SOCs Currently Fund 
Headquarters Support Costs? 
The six theater SOCs have developed individual funding 
mechanisms for headquarters support costs.  Chapter III 
makes a comparative analysis of these funding arrangements.   
3. Why Did the Theater SOCs Use MFP-11 Dollars to 
Fund Headquarters Support Costs in FY00? 
Data from PBD 081 shows that five of the six theater 
SOCs used MFP-11 dollars for headquarters support costs in 
Fiscal Year 2000 (FY00).  Special Operations Command South 
(SOCSOUTH) was the lone exception.  Reasons for spending 
MFP-11 funds on headquarters support requirements varied 
among the theater SOCs and are explained in Chapter III. 
4. Should the Theater SOC Funding Mechanism for 
Headquarters Support Costs Be Uniform? 
By implementing Alternative No. 3 from Chapter IV, 
which would allow the theater SOCs to use MFP-11 dollars to 
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fund headquarters support costs, the theater SOC funding 
mechanisms would be uniform.  However, the Chapter IV 
summary also points out that the more standardized across 
the theater SOCs the selected alternative makes this 
funding mechanism, the greater the implementation obstacles 
and the more substantial the ensuing financial impact.  
This means that although Alternative No. 3 would make 
theater SOC funding mechanisms uniform, this alternative 
would face the most significant barriers to implementation 
and would cause the highest financial impact among the 
three options.       
As described in Section B of this chapter, since all 
the alternatives presented in Chapter IV formalize the 
funding mechanism for theater SOC headquarters support, the 
best alternative is the option with the lowest obstacles to 
implementation and the minimum financial impact: 
Alternative No. 2.  Thus, while Alternative No. 2 does not 
completely standardize this theater SOC funding mechanism, 
it does provide the enforcement tool necessary to ensure 
theater SOCs can properly resource their headquarters 
support requirements. 
5. What Authority is Required to Make Changes in 
Funding Theater SOC Headquarters Support Costs? 
Implementation requirements vary among the three 
alternatives.  Alternative No. 1, which would establish a 
U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) MFP-2 account, 
would require USD(C) to issue a PBD and to amend DoDD 
5100.3.  Alternative No. 2, which would assign separate PE 
numbers to theater SOC headquarters support funding and 
would distribute the funds through the respective theater 
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combatant commands, also would require USD(C) to issue a 
PBD and to amend DoDD 5100.3.   
Alternative No. 3, which would allow the theater SOCs 
to use MFP-11 dollars for headquarters support costs, has 
the same requirements for USD(C) as Alternative Nos. 1 and 
2: issue a PBD and amend DoDD 5100.3.  Additionally, 
Alternative No. 3 would require amending the definition of 
“special operations-peculiar” to include theater SOC 
headquarters support costs.  This modification would 
require the Joint Chiefs of Staff to revise Joint 
Publication 3-05 and the Congress to change Section 167 of 
Title 10, U.S. Code.  Chapter IV makes a comparative 
analysis of the three alternatives and provides additional 
evaluation of the implementation requirements and barriers 
to change. 
6. What is the Financial Impact of Alternative 
Funding Mechanisms for Theater SOC Headquarters 
Support Costs? 
Financial impact varied among the three alternatives.  
Alternative No. 1, which would establish a USSOCOM MFP-2 
account, would not affect Service O&M appropriations.  
Using FY00 figures, the alternative would change the route 
of $12,699,000 in total headquarters support funding from 
the six current distribution commands to the USSOCOM MFP-2 
account before final distribution to the theater SOCs.       
Alternative No. 2, which would assign separate PE 
numbers to theater SOC headquarters support funding and 
would distribute the funds through the respective theater 
combatant commands, also would not affect Service O&M 
appropriations.  This alternative would affect the funding 
mechanisms for Special Operations Command Central 
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(SOCCENT), SOCKOR and SOCSOUTH.  Using FY00 figures, the 
alternative would change the route of $4,215,000 in total 
headquarters support funding from the current distribution 
commands of these three theater SOCs to the appropriate 
theater combatant commands before final distribution to the 
theater SOCs.  In the unique case of SOCKOR command 
relationships, the funds would flow through U.S. Forces 
Korea (USFK) before reaching SOCKOR.  
Alternative No. 3 would allow the theater SOCs to use 
MFP-11 dollars for headquarters support costs.  Using FY00 
figures, the alternative would move $12,699,000 in total 
headquarters support funding from Service O&M 
appropriations to the USSOCOM O&M Defense-wide 
appropriation before direct distribution to the theater 
SOCs.  Chapter IV presents a comparative analysis of the 
three alternatives and provides additional financial 


















Table 16. Financial Impact of Theater SOC Headquarters 
and Support Funding Alternatives. 
[From: Ref. 12:p. 20] 
 
E. SUGGESTED FURTHER STUDIES 
1. Theater SOC Command Relationships 
This research would examine theater SOC designations 
as sub-unified commands of the theater combatant commands.  
This analysis would determine whether the existing theater 
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SOC command relationships support the most efficient and 
effective way to fight and fund special operations 
missions.  Research on this topic also should include an 
evaluation of theater SOC missions, alternative command 
structures and current world climate. 
2. USSOCOM as a Supported Command 
The Unified Command Plan states USSOCOM 
responsibilities include, “…command of selected special 
operations missions if directed to do so by the President 
or Secretary of Defense.”  [Ref. 36:p. 14]  This research 
would analyze the command relationships and funding 
implications if USSOCOM is permanently designated as a 
supported command.    
3. “Special Operations-Peculiar” 
This research would analyze the definition of “special 
operations (SO)-peculiar” and would evaluate whether 
existing legal references provide sufficient guidance to 
cover all the funding requirements for supporting SO 
missions.  Research on this issue also should include an 
analysis of the intent and the legal uses of MFP-11 dollars 
as specified in Section 167 of Title 10, U.S. Code.   
4. Theater SOC Base Operating Support 
In addition to SO-peculiar costs and headquarters 
support costs, the theater SOCs also have base operating 
support (BOS) requirements.  This research would analyze 
the BOS funding mechanisms at the six theater SOCs and 
would determine if the existing arrangements are adequate 
or if alternatives are necessary.    
5. Separating Theater SOC Requirements 
Appendix A is the Theater SOC Support Matrix provided 
to theater SOC comptrollers by USSOCOM in April 2000.  This 
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research could use the information in Appendix A as a 
baseline to develop comprehensive criteria for separating 
SO-peculiar requirements, headquarters support requirements 
and BOS requirements.  Conclusions from this research could 
help implement a formalized standard for separating theater 
SOC costs.  
6. Funding Mechanisms at Other Commands  
This research would identify other commands within the 
Department of Defense that have inadequate funding 
mechanisms.  Additionally, the study could use the criteria 
listed in Section C of this chapter in preliminary analysis 
for evaluating potential alternatives to these funding 
issues.  
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APPENDIX A.  THEATER SOC SUPPORT MATRIX 
                     TSOC (THEATER SOC) SUPPORT 
 
Bill Payer USSOCOM CINC/SV/EA 
COMMON SUPPORT   
NON-SO-PECULIAR RDT&E  X 
NON-SO PECULIAR PROCUREMENT  X 
NON-SO PECULIAR CONSTRUCTION  X 
REAL PROPERTY MAINTENANCE  X 
INSTALLATION/GENERAL PURPOSE CONSTRUCTION  X 
SUSTAINING BASE MEDICAL COSTS  X 
INDIVIDUAL ENTRY LEVEL TRAINING  X 
COMMON EQUIPMENT AND MAINTENANCE SUPPORT FOR   X 
   COMMON EQUIPMENT   
COMMON MODIFICATIONS  X 
COMMON VEHICLES  X 
COMMON AMMUNITION  X 
   
   
BASE OPERATIONS SUPPORT   
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES (records management, 
personnel Locator, forms, publications, 
official reference library, etc) 
 X 
 
AUDIO AND VISUAL INFORMATION SERVICES 
(photography, graphics, film, video and audio 
media services)  
  
X 
AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING AND AUTOMATION 
SERVICES  (data processing services and design, 
development, maintenance, etc., of data 
processing systems) Service Common Feeder 
Systems 
 X 
CHAPEL AND CHAPLAIN SERVICES (pastoral 
ministries, worship services, religious rites, 
spiritual counseling and religious education) 
  
X 
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SERVICES (Recruitment, 
classification, staffing personnel management, 
employee relations, awards, etc.) 
  
X 
CLUBS (officer, NCO, aero, community and 
recreational clubs) 
 X 
COMMAND SUPPORT (Oversight and management 
provided by the Installation Commander and 
command element staff.) 
  
X 
COMMON USE FACILITY CONSTRUCTION, OPERATIONS, 
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR (Construction, 
alteration, operation, Maintenance, and repair 
of common use infrastructure (roads, grounds, 
Structures, energy consumption, snow removal, 






COMMUNICATION SERVICES  (Dedicated 
communication svs and Telephone equipment.  May 
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                     TSOC (THEATER SOC) SUPPORT 
 
Bill Payer USSOCOM CINC/SV/EA 
lines, and special communications-electronics 
equipment services) Installation/Garrison Level 
X 
COMMUNITY RELATIONS (Public relations 
activities, charity fund raising events, and 
installation open house programs.) 
  
X 
COMMUNITY SERVICES (Family Support centers, 
child development centers, youth activity, 
theaters, and thrift shops) 
  
X 
CUSTODIAL SERVICES (Janitorial, cleaning 
services) 
 X 
DISASTER PREPAREDNESS (Disaster programs and 
related services, equipment, and facility 








EDUCATION SERVICES OFFERED BY THE INSTALLATION   X 
ENTOMOLOGY SERVICES (abatement and control 




   
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP (collection, clean-up, 




ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE (Recycling and 
pollution prevention, etc) 
  
X 
EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE, REPAIR AND CALIBRATION   
(Maintenance, repair and calibration of 
industrial equip, office equipment, lab 




EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE SUPPORT (Services and 
facilities for Explosive ordnance storage, 
disposal and training) 
  
X 
FACILITY CONSTRUCTION AND MAJOR REPAIR (Minor 
Construction, alterations, additions, and major 
repairs to Construction, alterations, 
additions, and major repairs to Modernize, 





FACILITY MAINTENANCE AND MINOR REPAIR (Routine 
and cyclical preventive maintenance and minor 
repairs.  Required to preserve or restore real 




FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING (provided by DFAS) 
Expenses, reimbursement, working fund, payroll 
and leave accounting disbursing, voucher and 




FIRE PROTECTION (normal services related to 
fire protection and fighting operations, alert 
service and rescue operations) 
  
X 
FOOD SERVICE (Preparation and service of food 
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                     TSOC (THEATER SOC) SUPPORT 
 
Bill Payer USSOCOM CINC/SV/EA 
HEALTH SERVICES (administration of health care, 




HOUSING AND LODGING SERVICES (Family, 
unmarried, and unaccompanied housing referral 





LAUNDRY AND DRY CLEANING SERVICES  X 
LEGAL SERVICES   X 
MAIL SERVICE  X 
MAIL POSTAGE SERVICE  X 
MAIL TRANSPORTATION OVERSEAS  X 
MILITARY PERSONNEL SUPPORT (passports, 
identification cards, security clearances, etc) 
Installation Level  
  
X 
MOBILIZATION SUPPORT  X 
MORALE, WELFARE AND RECREATION (recreation 
centers, gyms, parks, athletic fields, hobby 
shops, etc) 
 X 
MORTUARY SERVICES (logistical functions related 
to recovery, identification, care and 
disposition of deceased Personnel) 
  
X 
MUSEUMS   X 
POLICE SERVICES (law and order enforcement 




PRINTING SERVICES (centralized printing, 
binding, and mass mail addressing) 
  
X 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS (response to news media on 
behalf of government) 
 X 
PURCHASING AND CONTRACTING (acquisition and 
Contract management, procurement of property, 




REFUSE COLLECTION AND DISPOSAL (collection and 
disposal of trash and waste) 
  
X 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (Funds management, cost and 
budget formulation and execution)  
  
X 
RETIRED AFFAIRS (operation of retired affairs 




SAFETY (Operation of safety programs, 
education, and promotional efforts) 
  
X 
SECURITY SERVICES (security inspections, entry 
and Exit controls) 
 X 
SHUTTLE SERVICE (operations of local taxis, 
vans and Bus transportation) 
  
X 
SOCIAL ACTIONS (civilian and military personnel 




STORAGE AND WAREHOUSING (provision of space for 
receipt, storage, issue and shipment) 
  
X 
  86 
                     TSOC (THEATER SOC) SUPPORT 
 
Bill Payer USSOCOM CINC/SV/EA 
SELF HELP  X 
TECHNICAL AND LEGAL LIBRARIES  X 
TRAINING SERVICE (instruction and use of target 
ranges, simulators, etc.) 
  
X 
TRANSPORTATION SERVICES (transportation of 
Personnel, personal property, to include 





UTILITIES (water, sewage, electricity, natural 
gas, and fuel oil services.) 
  
X 
VEHICLE SUPPORT (maintenance and repair of 
Customer vehicles, supply maintenance and 
repair of Vehicles for customers’ use.) 
  
X 
WEATHER SERVICES  (Advising weather conditions)  X 
   
   
DIRECT HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT   
ADMINISTRATION (Mgt of admin communications, 




AUDIT (Mgt of audit programs, 
development/establishment Of audit objectives, 
policies, plans and standards) 
  
X 
COMMAND (Functions performed by head of 






COST ANALYSIS (Prep of estimates and operating 
costs of pgms, equip, systems, and collection, 





DATA AUTOMATION (Mgt of data standardization, 
equipment selection, system policies, and 








NATIONAL INTEL SATELLITE IMAGERY  X 
THEATER CINC C4 REQ’TS (TPFFD, software 
compliance, service common stds) 
  
X 
GLOBAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM  X 
ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION (Mgt of engrg 
pgms, design develop and review, 





ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES (Mgt of environmental 
pgms, including oceanographic and 





FACILTIES (Mgt of real estate, facilities and 
civil engrg or public works pgms.) 
  
X 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT (Mgt of budget, Acctg and 




INFORMATION AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS (Mgt of internal   
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                     TSOC (THEATER SOC) SUPPORT 
 
Bill Payer USSOCOM CINC/SV/EA 
and public/community relations pgms) X 
INSPECTION AND EVALUATION (Mgt of inspection 
and evaluation pgms, development/establishment 
of inspection and evaluation objs, policies, 




   
INTELLIGENCE  (Mgt of intel collection, 
analysis, production, and evaluation programs) 
  
X 
LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS (Mgt of legal and 
legislative pgms and legal services) 
  
X 
LOGISTICS (Mgt of supply, maintenance, 
transportation, procurement, production, and 
materiel programs) 
     Supply and Services (Supply pgms and 
services functions, such as clothing sales, 
mortuary, laundry, food svs.)  
    Transportation (Mil and cml air, sea, and 
surface trans pgms, motor vehicle mgt and 
logistic trans planning and control)  
    Materiel Management (Log support of 
weapon/nonweapon sys, equipment and commodities 
(delivery to disposal) 
    Procurement and Production (Procurement and 
production mgt for acq of weapon sys, equip, 



















MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION (Allocation and 
control of an orgn’s structure, manpower 





PERSONNEL (Mgt of civilian/military personnel 
pgms, such as staffing, career development, 
position classification, pay mgt, employee and 





POLICY, PLANS, AND PROGRAMMING (Formulation, 
coordination, and development of plans, 




RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (Mgt of basic and 
developmental research, test and engrg pgms) 
  
X 
RESERVE AFFAIRS (Mgt of reserve forces programs 
for service on active duty) 
  
X 
SECURITY (Mgt of physical, personnel, 






TELECOMMUNICATIONS (Mgt of comm pgrms as well 
as electronic-communications svs) C2IP 
  
X 
TRAINING AND EDUCATION (Mgt of training and 




PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT  SVC 
UNIT ADMINISTRATION (Direct support functions   
  88 
                     TSOC (THEATER SOC) SUPPORT 
 
Bill Payer USSOCOM CINC/SV/EA 
of unit supply preparation, duty roster 
maintenance, etc.) 
 X 
FORCE PROTECTION  X 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES COMBINED EXERCISE PROGRAM 
  (DCCEP) 
 X 
THEATER CINC ACTIVITIES (TCA)  X 
DEMINING  X 
HUMANITARIAN/CIVIL ASSISTANCE (HCA)  X 
COUNTERTERRORISM READINESS INITIATIVE FUND 
   (CT RIF) 
 X 
CINC INITIATIVE FUND (CIF)  X 
ERC  X 
JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF)  (Non-SOF)  X 
SOF AUGMENTATION WITH NON-SOF PERSONNEL  X 
MILPAY  SVC Execute 
CIVILIAN PAY (NON-SOF)  X 
EXERCISES (NON-SOF) NEOs, ESATs, PSATs, CSATs, 
etc. 
 X 
   
   
   
   
TSOC SOF OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS   
COMMUNICATIONS/ACQUISITION/MAINTENANCE    
     DEPLOYABLE SCAMPI X  
     IN-GARRISON HQ TSOC SCAMPI (10 
workstations, one server) 
X  
     SCAMPI ASSOCIATED AIRTIME (Satellite and 
land services) - 
      OPS  
X  
     SOCRATES WORKSTATIONS FOR SOF UNIQUE X  
     DEPLOYED C4 SYSTEMS W/ CONNECTIVITY TO SOF 
NETs 
X  
     VTC (1 deployable and 1 in-garrison) X  
DATA AUTOMATION (Mgt of data, standardization, 
equipment selection, system policies, and 
satellite data processing units and ADP 





FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT (Mgt of budget, Acctg and 





HISTORICAL AFFAIRS (Mgt of historical writing, 





INSPECTION AND EVALUATION (Mgt of inspection 
and evaluation pgms, development/establishment 
of inspection and evaluation objs, policies, 





INTELLIGENCE  (Mgt of intel collection, 





LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS (Mgt of legal and   
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                     TSOC (THEATER SOC) SUPPORT 
 
Bill Payer USSOCOM CINC/SV/EA 
legislative pgms and legal services) SO-
Peculiar 
X 
LOGISTICS (Mgt of supply, maintenance, 
transportation, procurement, production, and 
materiel programs) SO-Peculiar 
     Materiel Management (Log support of 
weapon/nonweapon sys, equipment and commodities 
(delivery to disposal)  
     Procurement and Production (Procurement 
and production mgt for acq of weapon sys, 








MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION (Allocation and 
control of an orgn’s structure, manpower 
resources, grade authorizations, and eval of 





OPERATIONS (Development and analysis of global 
or theater joint, combined, service component, 
strategic, defensive, and tactical ops, 
including operational readiness, plans and 
requirements, training, command and control 
services) SO-Peculiar 
      JTF/CJSOFT or JSOTF (TSOC HQ Staff Only) 
      Site Surveys for SOF Deployments (TSOC HQ 
Staff Only) 
      Equipment/Supplies (Non-SOF Organ/Member 









OPERATIONS ANALYSIS (Development of studies of 
operational pgms and analysis of operational 






POLICY, PLANS, AND PROGRAMMING (Formulation, 
coordination and development of plans, 





RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (Mgt of basic and 





RESERVE AFFAIRS (Mgt of reserve forces programs 




TRAINING AND EDUCATION (Mgt of training and 
educational pgms, research, evaluation and 




MILPAY (MFP-11) Programs  
CIVILIAN PAY (MFP-11) X  
EXERCISES (SOF)  (TSOC HQ Staff Only) X  
CONTINGENCIES (TSOC HQ Staff Only) X  
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APPENDIX B.  ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ASD(SO/LIC) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special 
Operations/Low Intensity Conflict) 
 
BOS   Base Operating Support 
 
CINC Commander in Chief 
 
DFAS Defense Finance and Accounting Service 
DoD   Department of Defense 
DoDD   Department of Defense Directive 
DW   Defense-wide 
 
EA   Executive Agent 
EUSA   Eighth United States Army 
 
FAD   Funding Authorization Document 
FY   Fiscal Year 
FYDP   Future Years Defense Program 
 
HQ   Headquarters 
 
IG   Inspector General 
 
JP   Joint Publication 
 
LAN   Local Area Network 
 
MFP   Major Force Program 
MIPR   Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request 
 
No.   Number 
 
OAC   Operating Agency Code 
OBAD   Operating Budget Activity Document  
O&M   Operations and Maintenance 
 
PBAS   Program Budget and Accounting System 
PBD   Program Budget Decision 
PE   Program Element 
POM   Program Objective Memorandum 
 
SLAN   Secure Local Area Network 
SO   Special Operations 
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SOC   Special Operations Command 
SOCCENT  Special Operations Command Central 
SOCEUR  Special Operations Command Europe 
SOCJFCOM  Special Operations Command Joint Forces 
Command 
SOCKOR  Special Operations Command Korea 
SOCPAC  Special Operations Command Pacific 
SOCSOUTH  Special Operations Command South 
SOF   Special Operations Forces 
Sub-unified Subordinate Unified 
SV          Service 
 
TSOC   Theater Special Operations Command 
 
U.S.   United States 
USC   United States Code 
USCENTCOM  United States Central Command 
USCINCSOC Commander in Chief, United States Special 
Operations Command 
USD(C)  Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)  
USEUCOM  United States European Command 
USFK   United States Forces Korea 
UFR   Unfunded Requirement 
USJFCOM  United States Joint Forces Command 
USPACOM  United States Pacific Command 
USPACFLT  United States Pacific Fleet 
USARSO  United States Army South 
USSOCOM  United States Special Operations Command 
USSOUTHCOM United States Southern Command 
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